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1 Introduction: Globalization, Economic Freedoms, Social Rights and the EU 
Historically, the 20th century introduced elements to the international legal context that 
have permanently changed our perception of society. The emergence of the human rights 
as an international, regional and national discourse has created a rising, influential 
tendency of actively promoting and defending workers’ rights among both litigants and 
lobbyists with various human rights instruments. While the reasons behind utilization of 
such concepts are evidently different and the mechanisms associated with the usage of 
human rights instruments vary, there is a perceivable link between the human rights 
discourse and the effects of market-led globalization.1 It could be said that one of the side 
effects of globalization is the ever-growing interest in the field of fundamental social 
rights2 and that the status of workers’ rights symbolizes the status of human rights in 
different countries in general. One of the first signs of a deteriorating situation is typically 
the violation of the most fundamental of workers’ rights i.e. the freedom of association.3   
In the field of labor rights the traditional labor laws and regulatory institutions have had 
their difficulties to keep up with the pace of transformations in the global economy. The 
effects of globalization have — inter alia — raised widespread issues or even abuses such 
as child labour, punishingly long work days, harsh discipline, hazardous working 
conditions, sexual predation, and suppression of the freedom to associate and organize. 
One of the strongest indications of supranational intent to address these issues is captured 
in the core labor standards adopted by the ILO.4 The intent is not as clear, however, when 
it comes down to the actual actions that should be done in order to address the issues.5 
From the perspective of legal interpretation, the relationship of the conflict between 
economic freedoms and fundamental social rights has never been the easiest. It is a 
relationship often characterized by enormous tensions.6 Within the area of the European 
                                                 
1 Novitz & Fenwick 2010, p. 1. 
2 Deakin 2005, p. 25; Leary 1996, p. 27. 
3 Leary 1996, p. 22. 
4 Sabel, O’Rourke & Fung 2000, p. 4. 
5 Alston 2005, p. 2. 
6 Bücker & Warneck 2011, p. 13, quoting here, Bercusson B., in “Trade union movement and the European 
Union: Judgement day”, in ETUI Expert Group (Ed.): Labour Law and Social Europe – Selected Writings of 
Brian Bercusson, 2009, 387, 415 et seq. 
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Union the enlargement process in and after 2004 has brought a whole new level of 
complexity to the already complicated issue. Companies from the new Member States are 
relying on their economic freedoms as guaranteed by the EU, such as the freedom of 
establishment and the freedom to provide services, in order to gain access to the entire 
European market. At the same time, some companies from the old Member States are 
taking advantage of lower labour costs in the new Member States. Trade unions and 
workers from the old Member States are forced to take action in order to prevent unfair 
competition over wages and wage dumping with the tools that they have: The right to 
bargain collectively and the right to strike. These rights serve as instruments for defending 
existing standards and improving the living and working conditions of workers beyond the 
established minimum and are invoked in demanding equal treatment regardless of 
nationalities. Nonetheless, in the light of the recent developments it has become rather 
clear that the means are not always up to the task.7 
Quite unsurprisingly, the European Court of Justice (CJEU) has an influential part to play 
in this process. Before the CJEU’s rulings in cases Viking8, Laval9, Rüffert10 and 
Luxembourg11, social and economic rules were seen separately in the EU context. The 
traditional view is closely linked to the history of the EU’s development. The European 
Economic Community was founded to focus purely on economic issues with an 
understanding that social embedding of the market was not within the competence of the 
Community and needed to remain within the national realm. Even though the Treaty of 
Maastricht led to certain social competences being transferred to the European level and 
the Treaty of Lisbon went even further by aiming to strengthen the ‘Social Europe’ built on 
three pillars12, these developments never questioned the national systems of industrial 
relations or the rights to bargain collectively and freedom of association. Lately, however, 
this division has been subject to re-evaluation. The fundamental change was ultimately 
brought by the aforementioned case law of the CJEU, jointly referred to as the ‘Laval 
quartet’.  In short, the Court ended up ruling that even if the named areas fell outside the 
                                                 
7 Bücker & Warneck 2011, pp. 13–14. 
8 C-438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation v. Viking Line [2007] ECR I-10779. 
9 C-341/05 Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet [2007] ECR I-11767. 
10 C-346/06 Dirk Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen [2008] ECR I-1989. 
11 C-319/06 Commission v Luxembourg [2008] ECR I-4323. 
12 Social market, social rights and new forms of soft law. 
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scope of the EU’s competences Member States must nevertheless comply with EU law.13 
These rulings have been considered by various scholars and observers alike to represent a 
victory for those who support liberal markets over more socially oriented integration.14 
The introduction of Regulation No 864/2007 on the Law Applicable to Non-Contractual 
Obligations (Rome II) is remarkable for a number of reasons. Even though the regulation 
of torts in the EU has a long history dating back to the preparation of the Rome Convention 
in 1967, the negotiations of Rome II were everything but easy. For instance, it was during 
these negotiations that the European Parliament and the Council applied the co-procedure15 
first time ever to a regulation concerning private international law. The text required 
numerous amendments and the Council and the Parliament had obvious difficulties in 
reaching an agreement. The importance of the matter is emphasized by the fact that these 
efforts to develop European conflict-of-law rules ultimately brought cross-Atlantic 
attention to a whole new level.16  
Despite the fact that the negotiations of Rome II proved to be overall difficult, there is one 
specific rule regarding which the controversies far exceeded any other matter covered by 
the Regulation. The rule in question is the special provision for industrial action. Article 9 
of the Rome II Regulation has created the greatest discord among the member states of all 
the matters of discussion related to the Rome II. The adoption of the special rule was 
objected by Latvia and Estonia at a very early stage in the adoption process. Both Member 
States identified Article 9 as their sole reason for voting against both the Common 
Position17 and the Regulation in its final form. In their joint statement of 13 September 
2006, both Member States underlined that Art 9 could on restrict the freedom to provide 
services as guaranteed by Community law. It is only reasonable to assume that the 
statement was directly prompted by the then pending cases of Laval and Viking. The 
statement was not manifestly incorrect. The political sensitivity of the issue is reflected in 
                                                 
13 Bücker & Warneck 2011, p. 14. 
14 Bamber et al. 2010a, p. 17. 
15 As defined in Article 294 of the TFEU, the co-decision procedure is the legislative process which is central 
to the Community's decision-making system. It is based on the principle of parity and means that neither 
institution (European Parliament or Council) may adopt legislation without the other's assent. 
16 Kramer 2008, pp. 1–3; The Regulation caught remarkable attention in the US. The European Parliament’s 
rapporteur for Rome II, Diana Wallis, also invited many of the non-European scholars whom had published 
on the matter to interact in the Brussels negotiations. 
17 Council Common Position (EC) No. 22/2006 of 25 Sept. 2006, at pp. 76–77, 2006 O.J. (C 289E) 68 
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the decisions which have now opened up the possibility of claims by employers against 
trade unions based on the restrictive element of industrial action on the fundamental 
freedoms guaranteed by EU law. Such claims would appear to fall within the scope of the 
Regulation. And, furthermore, these claims may justify the application of the special rule 
in Art 9 to determine the law applicable to matters not regulated by EU laws.18 
                                                 
18 Dickinson 2008, pp. 474–475 
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2 Research Questions and the Scope of the Study 
The research problem of this thesis is all about comprehending the complexity of different 
rules and approaches concerning the right to strike in present day Europe. The issue and 
underlying presumption here is that the right to strike faces a different reality in each and 
every country throughout Europe. Traditionally speaking, the EU does not have 
competences to address matters related to the freedom of association by legislative means 
i.e. the right to strike as such is not nor should not be subjected to harmonization measures 
in a strict sense. There are differences in how the Member States address the right to strike 
or freedom of association in general. It is vital to understand how and why matters like EU 
legislation and CJEU jurisprudence — more precisely the Rome II Regulation and the 
Laval quartet — are highly important in this respect. The primary aim of this study is to 
seek definition for or the content and scope of the concept of the right strike and to 
understand the existing diversity within the EU area. The primary research question is the 
following: 
How could the ‘right to strike’ be defined or understood as a legal concept in 
the Member States and how does this determination compare to the approach 
adopted by the CJEU in its recent jurisprudence? 
Thus an important part of the study is not only to consider what the Member States 
consider as legitimate means of exercising the right to strike but also to identify the forms 
of potential conflict that may arise between national and supranational legislation when 
dealing with a multipolar legal order such as the EU. The Member States and the EU itself 
may very well define or approach the definition of a legitimate action differently.  
One aspect that is taken into consideration is the development and preparatory work of the 
Rome II and especially that of Art 9 on industrial action. Thus also the principles related to 
the interpretation of Community regulations need to be regarded. Given the 
aforementioned lack of competences, it should also be evaluated how the EU could 
approach the right to strike with alternative means to harmonization of laws or legislative 
action. In other words, it is considered if there are any Community measures available that 
could contribute to the determination at the EU level. The relevance of the recent CJEU 
jurisprudence regarding industrial actions should be taken into account throughout the 
study. Furthermore, as the freedom of association is has stabilized its position as an 
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internationally recognized fundamental right, the definitions used in (public) international 
law should be taken into consideration as they presumably provide content for the relevant 
rights in the Member States. With regard to these aspects, the primary question of the study 
is complemented and further evaluated in two different relations:  
(a) How do the rules of applicable law affect the exercising of the right to 
strike in the Member States? And,  
(b) If it is possible to determine, how is the right to strike and/or how could it 
be approached with soft law instruments? 
Given that the questions place a strong focus on the Member States of the EU, it should be 
recognized that a truly comprehensive comparative study within the framework of this 
study would probably not be reasonable or very useful. The fact of the matter is that it can 
be, and has been, done better and in much greater detail than it would ever be possible at 
the level of a Master’s thesis. Thus a few delimitations to the scope of the study are 
necessary. First, primary comparative aspects of the study focus on three different 
industrial relations systems in Europe: The Nordic model19, United Kingdom and 
Germany. While the focus from among the Member States of EU is on these three regimes, 
it does not, in my opinion, explicitly rule out comparative remarks made to other countries 
when it seems reasonable. The main reason behind the choice of restricting the evaluation 
to these industrial relations systems is the distinctively direct connection to the Laval 
quartet20 but also because of a simple practical perspective. In my opinion, the availability, 
quality, and quantity of literature concerning these regimes far exceeds other alternatives 
for the purposes of this work. With respect to this, however, it should be recognized that 
the scholarly perspective the study is conducted from is inherently Finnish, which might 
also introduce some level of influence to certain aspects of this thesis. Naturally, I will try 
to retain a certain level of objectivity as a substantial part of the study concerns rules and 
principles of EU or international origin. 
Regarding the content of the study, there are also a few other substantive matters that are 
excluded from the scope of the study. Any considerations concerning European Works 
                                                 
19 The Nordic model in the sense of this work is represented by Finnish and Swedish systems. 
20 Worth mentioning that the cases are jointly referred to as the Laval quartet throughout the study for 
practical reasons, even though the Luxembourg case is not explicitly dealt with. 
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Councils (EWC), despite their apparent relationship to the national industrial relations 
systems, are not dealt with. This is primarily due to the fact that EWC’s do not typically 
have any part to play in industrial disputes which are at the very heart of this study. Also, 
the impact of the EU’s future accession to the European Convention on Human Rights 
shall not be considered to the extent of its hypothetical implications on the division of 
jurisdiction between the CJEU and the ECtHR but the possible effects of the ECHR on the 
definition of the industrial action are somewhat considered. 
 
2.1 About the Method: Legal Doctrine and Comparative Law 
One of the most essential features of legal research is that the focus of a study should be on 
questions that are, from a legal perspective, relevant. In other words, the topic should 
somehow concern legal norms that actively interact with the surrounding society by 
legislation or legal thought.21 The most common method of legal research is legal doctrine 
(often referred to as legal dogmatics22), which consist of a systematic, analytical evaluative 
exposition of the substance of existing field of law i.e. private law, criminal law, public 
law, etc. The primary purpose of the legal doctrine is to clarify the content and meaning of 
the existing law regarding a specific juridical issue. Thus the legal doctrine seeks to answer 
the question of how one should or how does the law actually function according to the law 
in force. Even though the research may include philosophical, sociological, historical, and 
various other forms of considerations, its core consists of the interpretation and 
systematization of valid law.23 When compared to the methods used in, for instance, other 
social sciences the legal doctrine is very unique as it is substantially devoted to practical 
functioning. The issues are approached by evaluating and formulating well-grounded 
arguments and weighing them to other possible lines of argumentation.24 It would be 
practically impossible, and even inefficient, to find a single, absolutely right way to form 
                                                 
21 Husa et al. 2008, p. 17. 
22 The terminology is not uniform. Legal doctrine is also called, for instance, “analytical study of law” or 
“doctrinal study of law” etc.; Pattaro & Pecnezik 2005, pp. 1–2; Timonen 1998, p. 1. 
23 Husa et al. 2008, p. 20; Pattaro & Pecnezik 2005, pp. 1–2. 
24 Timonen 1998, p. 3. 
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and present a valid argument, as these are highly dependent on the overall framework of 
the study.25  
Private international law has a more intimate relationship with comparative law than 
practically any other legal subject area. The primary reason for this is that both disciplines 
deal with foreign legal systems: Comparative law studies foreign legal systems directly, 
while on the other hand, private international law intends to solve potential conflicts 
between domestic and foreign law. There are, however, a few key differences one should 
recognize when conducting legal research. According to Reimann, comparative law is not 
a body of rules but rather an academic discipline as well as a legal method and thus more 
comparable, for example, to legal history. Private international law is, by definition, a body 
of positive rules and thus more comparable, for example, to civil procedure. Naturally, the 
field of private international law encompasses considerable amount of theoretical and 
academic interest, but the primary purpose of the discipline is ultimately practical: 
Decisions of transboundary issues in actual disputes.26 
Comparative law evaluates the regulations and legal phenomenon between at least two 
legal systems of different countries. Even though it is possible to use comparative law as 
an independent method of legal research it is often used to complement a research 
conducted with the primary legal doctrine. It is possible to utilize comparative law research 
with an emphasis on legal doctrine if, for instance, the purpose is to find out how a matter 
subject to a certain rule in one legal system is regulated in other systems.27 With respect to 
the scope of this study — as stated above — a comprehensive comparative research does 
not come to question at this point but, as the study includes elements that could be 
described as identifying differences and similarities, the peculiarities of comparative law 
are definitely worth considering. 
Furthermore, there are a few elements included in this study that are bound to (public) 
international law. Therefore it is only reasonable to consider the relationship between the 
disciplines of private and public international law shortly. Traditionally public 
international law has been distinguished from private international law or conflicts of law. 
                                                 
25 Timonen 1998, pp. 7, 15–17. 
26 Reimann 2006, pp. 1364–1365 
27 Husa et al. 2008, pp. 23–24. 
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From the perspective of public international law private international law is a regime that is 
a branch of internal law which, in a private law transaction implicating more than one legal 
system, determines which is the governing legal system under the existing circumstances 
of a dispute.28 Even though in this sense there are significant differences between the two 
disciplines, it should be emphasized that the distinction between internal law, including 
private international law, and international law today is not as strict as it historically used 
to be. Rosenne has argued – already back in 1984 – that the increasing number of 
international transactions involving States, international organizations, multinational 
enterprises and entities, quasi-public bodies and individuals, especially juridical persons 
makes the distinction difficult. It is not always clear whether these transactions are 
governed by any particular system of internal law or by public international law or by a 
combination of both. This phenomenon is commonly described as transnational law, but 
also be considered as interstitial law as it forces itself into the interstices between various 
systems of law. Regardless of the name given to the phenomenon, the regime is growing 
importance in modern international political and economic life, international trade-
unionism, industrial cartelization, liner conferences etc.29 
 
2.2 Methodological Framework of the Study 
This study seeks to analyze the legal issues outlined at the beginning of this chapter and, 
also from a practical perspective, determine how a specific legal concept i.e. the right to 
strike or the right to take collective action could be formulated within the Community area. 
The study, which does concern the field of private international law and to some extent 
international labour law, is conducted utilizing the method of legal doctrine and it includes 
comparative aspects complementing the primary purposes of the study by identifying and 
defining certain legal concepts and the content of law in the selected Member States of the 
EU and at the level of the EU itself. For instance, the aforementioned objectives of the 
study necessitate that the effects the Laval quartet has introduced in the Member States are 
                                                 
28 Rosenne 1984, p. 9. 
29 Rosenne 1984, pp. 11–12. 
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compared, as it is possible – or should be even presumed30 – that these effects differ, which 
then again might have relevance for the definition of the concept of industrial action. The 
relationship between public and private international law is an important aspect that is 
needed to be aware of when dealing with a subject that concerns different legal regimes 
acting on multiple levels, i.e. national and supranational, as both the EU and international 
treaties place obligations for the Member States. In this chapter I will try to identify a few 
significant issues and concerns that require attention regarding the topic of the study and 
the different divisions of supranational legislation. The chapter also considers a theoretical 
concept by Christian Joerges based upon the conflict of laws methodology as a new (and 
necessary) approach to supranational and transnational law-generating structures. 
“The European Court of Justice is not a Supreme Court for private law disputes in the 
European Union.”31 
The European Community is unique regarding legal argumentation. The construction of an 
“association of states” is symbolized by the various different forms of conflict between 
supranational and national law. A general equalizing formula, such as the integrative effect 
of a constitution in a state, does not exist.32 Joerges suggests that within the multi-level 
European system it is possible to distinguish between three forms of legal collision – 
vertical, “diagonal” and horizontal. The diagonal collisions are a unique feature of multi-
level systems such as the EU. Thus their recognition is important as they are present 
constantly within EU and since the competences required for actual problem solving exist, 
at times, at the level of the EU itself. The metaphor of multi-level system asserts that there 
is no European “rule” that could be organized hierarchically.33  
The classic private international law or the conflicts provisions of administrative law for 
territorially-determined “horizontal” conflicts along with the respective logic of referral are 
hardly adequate in such cases. Rules of primacy for constitutional law and the Community 
                                                 
30 Bücker & Warneck 2011, p. 16: in short, the impact of the Viking – Laval – Rüffert rulings will vary 
substantially in different Member States. 
31  
32 Ladeur 2010, p. 175; Ladeur illustrates the situation with an example where European competition law 
meets with national broadcasting law. This conflict could take place in a purely national context, but the 
division of authority usually follows the definition of subjects of competence nevertheless. And, in EU these 
competences are determined ultimately by the goals of the internal market. Thus it would first need to be 
answered: is it possible to designate organizations such as radio as economic activity and regulate it as such? 
33 Joerges 2010, p. 391. 
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rules for vertical conflicts do not, in principle, serve the purpose either. According to 
Ladeur, stable demarcations do not or cannot provide satisfying results. What could be 
utilized effectively, if thought as conflicts laws, are rules of mutual agreement and co-
operation determined by individual cases. In this sense, arranging the conflict to be of 
“diagonal” type seems compatible. In other words, one could also speak of a limited 
overlap of general national administrative law and particular European administrative law - 
a problem which is hardly solved with rules primacy, as the duty to ensure effet utile is 
ultimately derived from the principle of co-operation as stated in Art 4(3) of TEU (Art 10 
EC). The implication is not merely a duty to effectively implement European 
administrative law, but to make general forms of civil and administrative law permeable 
for the fulfilment of the features of a multipolar legal order. The expectation of co-
operation is not unidirectional. For example, the institutions of general administrative law 
simply cannot ignore the realization of the interests of the EC and other Member States or 
of the citizens of these states when interpreting the factual content of “public interest”. The 
‘diagonal character’ of the collision also works the other way around in a way that no 
primacy in favour of one or the other legal system can be foreseen.34 
According to Joerges, the normative argument favoring a new understanding of existing 
EU law is significant in many ways. This understanding furnishes a justification for the 
validity of the supranational jurisdiction. The interdependence between the Member States 
of EU has led to a new reality, where they are no longer in a position to guarantee the 
democratic legitimacy of their policies. EU law on the other hand seeks to compensate 
these ‘failings of the national democracies’ and just might induce its legitimacy from this 
compensatory function. European law has given force to principles and rules that serve the 
purpose of supranational “recognition”. Joerges presents a well-founded clarification with 
an example: ‘the non-discrimination principle, the supranational definition and 
demarcation of legitimate regulatory concerns, the demands for justification for actions 
that are imposed upon national legal systems, and the proportionality principle — which 
supplies a legal yardstick against which respect for supranationally-guaranteed freedoms 
may be measured — and the demand that all rules may be understood as a concretization 
                                                 
34 Ladeur 2010, p. 176. 
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of a supranational conflicts law, which guarantees that the actions of the Member States 
are reconcilable with their position within the Community.’35 
As the competences are divided between the EU and Member States, the division 
introduces two types of potential conflict that would require mediation arrangements to be 
identified. There are the possibilities of divergent EU and national political orientations, 
and between divergent interest constellations in the Member States. Every multi-level 
system has a need for mediation, but in the case of EU it is of particular importance. The 
existence of diagonal conflict has resulted in the evolution of intense degree of 
administrative co-operation, the institutionalization of advice-giving instances, and the 
systematic construction of non-governmental co-operative relationships. This complex 
structure can be seen to provide the integral components of a conflicts law that is unable to 
restrict itself to the individual adjudication of situational cases of conflict and must 
constantly be engaged in finding more general solutions to universal problems. 
Simultaneously, the conflicts law must be open to evolution, both methodologically and 
organizationally, as a practice that has seen (and partly overcome) the development of 
post-interventionist regulatory practices and legal forms within national law.36 
Given the previous points as they were presented by Joerges, it would be unreasonable to 
regard European law in a manner that it is dedicated to constructing a completely 
comprehensive legal system. Europe has a task to uphold its own motto, “united in 
diversity” and learn how to accept that it will be accompanied by its internal diversity in 
the process of integration. Europeanization is not merely a process of change but a learning 
process as well. Integration should be overseen by conflicts law that is able to generate the 
law of the European multi-level system via its identification of the principles and rules that 
govern conflict. The substance of the process cannot be pre-determined by law but it is, 
however, possible to secure the normative character of the law in a way that defends its 
justice and fairness within.37 
                                                 
35 Joerges 2010, pp. 390–391. 
36 Joerges 2010, p. 391; he identifies three types of European conflicts law, which operate in three 
dimensions: conflicts law of the ”first order”, conflicts law specific for the European comitology (which has 
concerned itself to developing substantive regulatory options) and conflicts law governing the supervision of 
para-legal law and self-regulatory organization. 
37 Joerges 2010, p, 392. 
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2.3 The Structure of the Study 
The substantive part of the study consists of 4 chapters which are briefly introduced here. 
The first of these chapters, chapter 3, concerns the developments within the sphere of EU 
conflicts law. In other words the chapter 3 seeks to determine how the concept of industrial 
action in Art 9 of Rome II should be interpreted and how does the CJEU approach the 
conflict between fundamental social rights and fundamental freedoms as they originate 
from EU law. The chapter summarizes the backgrounds and circumstances over which the 
highly controversial debate revolved and which eventually led to the introduction of the 
special provision concerning industrial action. Also, the second part of the chapter is 
devoted to a short presentation and analysis of the Laval quartet. Despite its high level of 
importance in general the Luxembourg case is not, however, analyzed in this study as it 
does not concern industrial action or the right to strike in a similar sense as the cases 
Viking and Laval do. For the same reasons, the Rüffert case is also slightly less dealt with 
but the drastic implications it has introduced especially in Germany necessitate a certain 
level of attention.  For clarity purposes the term ‘Laval quartet’ is nevertheless used 
throughout the study regarding this series of cases. 
The following chapter 4 seeks to determine the key issues regarding social regulation 
within the EU and to analyze the effects of the relevant cases on national industrial 
relations systems in the reference countries. It should be noted that the part dealing with 
the characteristics of the industrial relations system in the UK is slightly more detailed in 
comparison to the previous chapters dealing with the Nordic model and Germany. This due 
to the fact that, from the author’s viewpoint, the common law system is more complex and 
restrictive than its counterparts under comparison. Hence, its successful understanding is 
slightly emphasized. 
The chapter 5 concerns the essence of the right to strike as it is viewed in various 
international Conventions and Treaties to which the EU Member States are also parties to. 
The idea here is that the international background of the regulation regarding freedom of 
association should provide at least some level of content to the right to strike as the latter 
has been held a direct offspring of it. Finally, conclusions of the study are presented in 
chapter 6. 
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3 Developments within the EU Conflicts Framework 
When we are dealing with rules concerning the applicable law that are not of national 
origin, there are few basic considerations that need to be regarded. First, by the virtue of 
general principles of public international law38 on the interpretation and implementation of 
treaty obligations, the court of the forum state must always consider that the conflict rules 
that are based on international instruments should be interpreted accordingly with the 
treaty they originate from.39 Second, regarding legislation of EU origin, one of the very 
basic principles is the autonomous interpretation. The autonomy of the text of the 
regulations is vital in order to ensure their consistent interpretation throughout the Member 
States. The principle has been constantly emphasized by the CJEU concerning the Brussels 
Convention. In Tessili v Dunlop40 the Court stated that the Convention frequently uses 
words and legal concepts that have a different meaning from one Member State to another. 
Thus the question was raised whether these concepts should be regarded as having their 
own independent meaning which would be common to all the Member States or, 
alternatively, referring to the substantive rules of the law applicable in each case under the 
rules of conflict of laws of the court before which the matter is brought. Even though in 
Tessili the Court eventually took the view that it was not possible to provide an 
autonomous concept of ‘place of performance’ of a contractual obligation in Art 5(1) of the 
Brussels Convention it was not more than a week later that the Court made it clear that this 
approach is an exception rather than a rule. This was the path that would also predominate 
in its later case law on the Brussels Convention, such as Eurocontrol, Kalfelis v Schröde, 
and Shearson Lehman Hutton.41 
The Rome II Regulation has effect in the Member States without the need for specific 
implementing legislation and, since the United Kingdom and Ireland elected to participate 
in the adoption and application of the Regulation, it is applied in all Member States except 
                                                 
38 Namely Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
39 Bogdan 2012, p. 185. 
40 C-12/76 Industrie Tessili Italiana Como v. Dunlop AG [1976] ECR 1473. 
41 C-29/76 LTU Lufttransportunternehmen GmbH & Co KG v Eurocontrol [1976] E.C.R. 154; C-189/97  
Kalfelis v. Schröder Case [1988] E.C.R. 5565; Case C–89/91 Shearson Lehman Hutton v TVB 
Treuhandgesellschaft für Vermögensverwaltung und Beteiligungen mbH [1993] ECR I–139; Dickinson 
2008, pp. 120–121. 
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for Denmark.42 The provisions of the Regulation must be construed in accordance with the 
principles and guidelines as laid down by the CJEU and should thus be interpreted and 
applied in the light of the versions existing in the official languages of the Community. 
Accordingly, all of these versions must be recognized as having the same weight regardless 
of the size of the population of the Member States using the language in question. Thus, 
when determining the single meaning and effect to be given to each provision of the 
Regulation all of the 23 language versions must be taken into account. As a general rule, 
interpretations reconcilable with all of the languages should be given preference over those 
compatible with only some of them.43 
The legal terms used in conflict rules are subject to interpretation just like any other legal 
rules and, evidently, their interpretation is not always unproblematic. The problem of 
characterization44 relates to the need to classify the issue to be decided as belonging to a 
subject matter scope of application of a specific conflict rule of the forum. As an example, 
Bogdan explains that ‘it has to be decided whether the issue at hand concerns, in the 
terminology of the conflict rules, the right to inheritance, non-contractual liability, 
procedure, or falls within the scope of application of one of the other conflict rules’. While 
the process can and may even usually be quite straightforward, that is not always the case. 
Especially when the question in the need of resolving is closely connected to more than 
one branch of law and these are subject to different conflict rules, characterization can be 
quite difficult.45 In contrast to this, however, if the legal concepts defining the scope of 
application of the forum country’s conflict rules have a clear meaning the answers to the 
questions of characterization are easier to determine. According to Bogdan, this is 
modestly rare in the private international law of most countries. As far as the Member 
States of the EU are concerned with the exception of Denmark, the Rome II Regulation 
should provide (some) solutions to the issue.46 
The Rome II holds the strong presumption that the concepts utilized in the Regulation 
receive autonomous interpretation.  The scope and the rules of applicable law should carry 
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a single, uniform meaning across the Member States, which is also clearly stated in the 
Recital (11), which verifies that since the concept of a non-contractual obligation varies 
from one Member State to another, for the purposes of the Regulation the concept of a 
‘non-contractual obligation’ is to be understood as an autonomous concept.47 Similarly, 
Recital (30), addressing the scope of Art 12 of the Regulation, provides that the concept of 
culpa in contrahendo is to be considered as an autonomous concept. Although there are no 
corresponding Recitals for the other rules of applicable law, that should not be taken as an 
indication that their scope would be subjected to the Member States’ rules and concepts. 
On the contrary, it should be taken as a presumption that the giving of a non-uniform 
meaning to a term used in the Regulation is exceptional. 48 There is, however, a certain 
Recital in the Regulation which just might indicate such an anomaly. According to some 
authors this could, or even should, be interpreted as an exception the general rule.49 The 
question is, of course, about the scope of Article 9. Recital 27 states the following: 
The exact concept of industrial action, such as strike action or lock-out, varies from one 
Member State to another and is governed by each Member State’s internal rules. 
Therefore, this Regulation assumes as a general principle that the law of the country 
where the industrial action was taken should apply, with the aim of protecting the rights 
and obligations of workers and employers. 
The CJEU seems to prefer a more ‘inclusive’ approach when it comes down to the 
definition of industrial action. Cases Viking and Laval addressed quite different means of 
action. Viking was about an organized effort to exercise negative freedom of contract at 
collective level whereas Laval was about a different type of boycott. These means are 
treated as expressions of the right to take collective action and CJEU even took the 
consideration one step further by stating that the general principle of European law on the 
right to take industrial action covers also blockades. The recognition can be understood as 
more comprehensive regarding the types of action covered in these cases as in both the 
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central issue was a sympathy action i.e. an action which intended to improve the conditions 
of workers attached to a different employer or a branch of economic activity.50 
3.1 Article 9 of Rome II: Industrial Action 
During the preparation process of Rome II, the addition of a special rule concerning non-
contractual obligations relating to industrial action resulted from an initiative of the 
Swedish Government, with the support of the European Parliament. Its introduction was 
strongly opposed by some Member State delegations and it was ultimately the only 
provision of the Council’s Common Position that was not unanimously supported by all 
Member States.51  In its initial response to the Commission Proposal, the Swedish 
delegation suggested that non-contractual obligations arising out of industrial actions 
should be governed by the law of the place where the action had been taken (locus actus). 
The perceived necessity for such a rule was linked to the decision of the CJEU in the 
DFDS Torline v SEKO52 case.  
3.1.1 The Need for a Special Provision: DFDS Torline 
In DFDS Torline, a Danish shipping company had brought an action against a Swedish 
trade union in the Danish Arbejdsret seeking to determine the lawfulness of a threatened 
industrial action to which a notice was given by a Swedish trade union acting in the 
interests of the Polish crew of a Danish ship operating between Gothenburg and Harwich. 
The threatened action consisted of blacklisting the ship Tor Caledonia by Swedish port 
workers, which would have effectively prevented its unloading in Swedish ports. To avoid 
this, DFDS chartered another ship to operate between Gothenburg and Harwich and, by 
separate proceedings brought in another Danish court (Sø- og Handelsret), sought remedies 
from the trade union consisting of costs of leasing a replacement ship. The Handelsret 
decided to stay its decision concerning the damages pending the decision of the Arbejdsret. 
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The Arbejdsret had, however, serious doubts about its jurisdiction to try the case. The 
question was essentially about the interpretation of Art 5(3) of the Brussels Convention.53 
The employer had the intention of obtaining a declaratory judgment and a prevention order 
via the court intervention. Repression or compensation was not at stake at any point in the 
Arbejdsret. First and foremost, the Arbejdsret faced an issue of whether or not legal 
proceedings limited to the actual lawfulness of an industrial action could be classified as 
proceedings relating to an obligation arising from tort. In Denmark, the jurisdiction to 
determine the lawfulness of industrial actions belongs strictly to the Arbejdsret, while other 
courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate claims for any consequential damages if necessary. 
Furthermore, the Arbejdsret had doubts whether Denmark was the state where the harmful 
event had occurred. As the ship was boycotted in Swedish waters and not in Denmark, the 
only element supporting the jurisdiction of the Danish court was the flag.54 
Article 2 of the Brussels Convention states that “Subject to the provisions of this 
Convention, persons domiciled in a Contracting State shall, whatever their nationality, be 
sued in the courts of that State.”55 In DFDS Torline the place of residence of the unions 
was Sweden and thus Art 2 did not provide the jurisdiction to try the case. Article 5 
paragraph 3 did, however, provide for an alternative forum for “matters relating to tort, 
delict or quasi-delict.” According to Art 5(3), a defendant who is domiciled in a Member 
State can also be summoned before the court of another Member State given that this is the 
court of the place where the harmful event occurred. The Danish shipowner relied on this 
article to justify the Arbejdsret’s jurisdiction, but the question was whether Art 5(3) could 
be used in this case.56 
Along with Advocate-General Jacobs, the CJEU was in favour of a broad interpretation of 
the concept “matters relating to tort, which would then also include legal disputes 
“concerning the legality of industrial action”.57 The CJEU ruled that both the lawfulness 
and damages actions fell within Art 5(3) of the Brussels Convention. Following its 
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established case law in Mines de potasse d'Alsace, Shevill and Others and Henkel58, the 
Court held that “the place in which the event which may give rise to liability in tort, delict 
or quasi-delict occurs and the place where that event results in damage are not identical, 
the expression ‘place where the harmful event occurred' in Article 5(3) of the Brussels 
Convention must be understood as being intended to cover both the place where the 
damage occurred and the place of the event giving rise to it”.59 The Court took the view 
that, even if the event giving rise to the damage had occurred in Sweden60, the financial 
loss i.e. the damage itself consisted directly of the withdrawal of a ship and replacing it 
with another and thus it should be up to the Danish court to determine whether that loss 
could be regarded as having arisen in Denmark. The CJEU also considered that — inter 
alia — the fact that Denmark was the flag State of the withdrawn ship was to be taken into 
account.61 Simplified, the CJEU ruled that it was for the Arbejdsret to decide the 
localization of the damage and that the flag’s nationality is an important factor in this 
determination. 
The question of jurisdiction raised an important question of how the court of the flag state 
would determine the applicable law that governs the tort. The conflict of laws rule of the 
court would play a highly decisive factor. If the rule would apply lex loci damni as a 
connecting factor, under the circumstances of DFDS Torline, the Swedish unions would 
have to face a foreign court and also run the risk that the legality of their collective action 
would be assessed by a law they are unfamiliar with. This would undoubtedly create 
significant risks especially in the case of a sympathy action. Furthermore, if the ship’s flag 
is used as the primary means to determine the jurisdiction, it would be practically 
impossible to organize an industrial action against ‘flags of convenience’62. The 
shipowners would be granted an ability to choose any flag of preference which would not 
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only determine the law applicable to the employment contracts of the crew but also to any 
sympathy action launched in their interest.63 
Overall, the primary effect of DFDS Torline was that Art 5(3) extends to an action seeking 
to establish the illegality of industrial action even where, under the law of the forum State, 
exclusive jurisdiction over such an action belongs to a court other than the court which has 
jurisdiction over claims for compensation for losses caused by the industrial action. The 
Court also established that a necessary causal connection between damages and a wrongful 
act exists in circumstances where an industrial action is a necessary precondition for 
sympathy action which can result in harm. It was also ruled that the application of Art 5(3) 
is not affected by the fact that the industrial action was suspended by the trade union 
pending a rule on its legality.64 The Arbejdsret accepted jurisdiction and concluded that the 
damage had occurred on board the ship. Danish law was applied to the case and the 
industrial action conducted in Gothenburg declared illegal under Danish law.65 
3.1.2 Travaux préparatoires 
If there had been any doubts before, it became evident after DFDS Torline that the 
application of the rules of the country where the damage occurred can effectively frustrate 
the exercising of the right to take industrial action. And such effects needed some 
countering. The original proposal of the European Commission for Rome II66 did not, 
however, include a separate rule for industrial action. The European Economic and Social 
Committee did not insist having one either, even though some of the members of the 
Committee are workers’ representatives. The incorporation of the special provision came 
from the exclusive initiative of the European Parliament.67 During the Council’s 
deliberations the Swedish delegation had argued that since the wording of the relevant 
provision of the proposed Rome II Regulation is very similar to Art 5(3) of the Brussels 
Convention, the consequence of the decision in DFDS Torline would be that the legality of 
an industrial action carried out in order to secure working conditions in the state in which 
the work is to be performed, could be governed by another law. The Swedish delegation 
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also pointed out that, under Swedish law, the trade unions actively seek to secure 
appropriate terms and conditions of employment and that this process may involve the 
taking of industrial action. The delegation concluded that the decision in DFDS Torline 
made a special rule for industrial action essential for Sweden.68 
The European Parliament proposed a rule in its 1st reading stage the following year. The 1st 
Reading position stated that “The law applicable to a non-contractual obligation arising 
out of industrial action, pending or carried out, shall be the law of the country in which the 
action is to be taken or has been taken.”69 According to the Report of the EP JURI 
Committee ‘the rights of workers to take collective action, including strike action, 
guaranteed under national law must not be undermined’. The EP’s proposed rule was, 
however, rejected by the Commission in its Amended Proposal as being too rigid. The 
proposed rule did not only favour locus actus instead of locus damni, but did not allow any 
exceptions based on the country of common residence or on the closer connection of the 
parties. And meanwhile, in terms of acquired support, the Swedish proposal was not too 
successful in the Council’s Rome II Committee either. In the beginning of 2006 only one 
other delegation had indicated explicit support to it. This forced Sweden to adjust its 
proposal. The primary argument was then that industrial relations systems in different 
countries are often unique and protected by strong governmental interests and, to this 
extent, the difference is significant to the other situations covered by the general rule. The 
delegation also concluded that each national system balances the interests of the parties in 
the market and this balance would be seriously disturbed if an industrial action taken in 
one country (in compliance with the national system there) could lead to liability under the 
law of another country.70 
At the following meeting of the Rome II Committee, a number of delegations indicated a 
level of support to the proposal, but many remained opposed. Nevertheless, the rule was 
accepted by a majority of the Member States as an element in the Council’s Common 
Position. In its communication responding to the Common Position, the Commission 
reacted more favorably to the new detailed definition of the scope of the rule, but a few 
doubts remained. The primary concern was that, according to the Commission, the text was 
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still unclear that it should not extend to relationships vis-à-vis third parties and lacked 
clarity in this sense.71 Exactly like the EP’s proposal, the Common Position used the locus 
actus as the main connecting factor, but in addition it also identified the provisions scope 
ratione personae. This clarification was actually both an extension and a restriction in 
comparison to the EP’s proposal. The applicability of Art 9 to persons only in the capacity 
of a worker or an employer (or the organizations representing their professional interests) 
broadens the scope from the original intention of safeguarding workers’ rights to include 
an action by employers as well. In this respect, the scope of original proposal was 
significantly widened. The Common Position also recognized the application of the law of 
the country of common residence, but did not refer to the country more closely 
connected.72 
3.1.3 Scope and Content of Article 9 
The definition adopted in the Common Position became final. Article 9 of the Rome II 
introduces industrial action as a separate subcategory in the conflict of laws, differing 
substantially from the primary principle of Article 4. The special provision promotes the 
locus actus instead of lex loci damni as a connecting factor and it does not allow deviations 
based on a closer connection, whereas Article 4 is sort of ‘open-ended’ with secondary 
provisions. The collective action as such is not submitted to a special rule, but only the 
non-contractual obligations rising therefrom. The provision also introduces an issue of 
classification. To determine the scope of Art 9, it is needed to be determined which 
relationships involved in a collective action are considered as non-contractual and which 
subjects could have carried out the industrial action. Second, it must be considered whether 
or not the event causing the damage can be characterized as an ‘industrial action’. Third, it 
should be determined whether liability can be established in relation to that specific action 
i.e. if a tortious consequence exists.73  
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3.1.3.1 Liability under Art 9 (Scope Ratione Personae) 
The liability of persons is restricted to those who are ‘in the capacity of a worker or an 
employer’ or of the organizations representing their personal interests.  The concept seems 
capable, for example, of extending to former employees and to those employed by others 
who participate in secondary action. However, it cannot be understood to extend to third 
parties, such as relatives or friends of workers or interest groups even though they may 
become involved in an industrial action.  It is suggestible that the ‘capacity of an employer’ 
should extend to the liability of those representing the employer in a trade dispute74.  And 
the reference to the organizations protecting the interests of workers and employers should 
extend to officials representing these organizations as well. Unless the scope would not 
encompass these aspects, the protection afforded to workers, employers and their 
representative organizations by Art 9 would easily be circumvented by suing an individual 
responsible for implementing particular action.75 
The reference to ‘the rights and obligations of workers and employers’ in Recital 27 may 
be understood to introduce an element of mutuality that restricts the scope of Art 9 to 
claims arising between the categories of persons referred to, i.e. workers, employers, and 
representative organizations. Thus any claims brought by third parties are excluded from 
the scope. However, as Dickinson points out, this question is open to debate. For example, 
which law should be applied to a claim against a trade union responsible for blockading a 
port in an employment dispute, when the port owner is brought before a Court by the 
owner of a cargo shipment that deteriorated in another country as a result of delay due to 
the blockade? Considering this, it seems reasonable that the Commission responded to the 
Council’s Common Position by expressing concerns as to the lack of clarity regarding the 
position of third parties.76  
Although the Commission preferred that Art 9 would not extend to liability other than that 
between the named parties, the objectives of foreseeability as to the law applicable and ‘the 
protection of the rights and obligations of workers under the law of the place of the 
industrial action’ may appear to point towards the application of Art 9 over the general rule 
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in circumstances similar to the aforementioned. Regardless of the preferred view, it is 
possible that this could be one of the occasions in which it is not ultimately possible to 
determine a reasonable balance between the interests of the person claimed to be liable and 
the person who has sustained damage.77 
3.1.3.2 Damages Caused by an Industrial Action 
In contrast to other provisions of the Regulation Art 9 refers to liability for ‘damages’ as in 
contrast to the singular form of ‘damage’ contained in other articles. Nevertheless, it 
should be clear that Art 9 is not restricted to an action for a monetary remedy 
corresponding to an award of damages in plural form. Art 9 contemplates a non-contractual 
obligation arising from industrial action that is ‘pending’ and ‘is to be’ taken in the future, 
which would seem, according to Dickinson, consistent only with a claim for injunctive or 
declaratory relief. Also, the DFDS Torline case, to which Art 9 was a direct response to in 
the first place, concerned monetary and non-monetary claims. And, the terminology used 
in other language versions78 suggests that what is contemplated is not a specific kind of 
remedy but separate elements of damage resulting from the same action. It could have been 
appropriate, having regard to the concept of ‘damage’ as defined in Art 2, to refer to 
‘damage caused by an industrial action’ in Art 9 to avoid the uncertainty resulting from the 
use of plural form. However, it is commonly accepted that the usage of plural form in an 
EC legislative instrument should be taken to include the singular as well.79 
Art 9 requires a causal link between the industrial action and the damage suffered by the 
claimant. French delegation had presented a proposal for a restrictive Recital to the scope 
of the special rule during the discussions in the Council’s Rome II Committee. This would 
have limited the scope to questions of ‘remedy and compensation for direct economic 
damage caused or likely to be caused’ by industrial action and excluded peripheral 
situations, such as violence committed during a strike, or attacks on property. Even though 
the proposal was not adopted, a similar result can be achieved by both a literal and a 
purposive construction of the words used in Art 9 and the relevant Recitals. In any 
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situations that are not concerned with the protection of the rights of workers and employers 
acting in those capacities the law applicable to the non-contractual obligation in question 
should be determined not by the rule of Art 9 but, if otherwise compatible, by the general 
rule in Art 4.80 
3.1.3.3 Exclusion of Matters relating to Industrial Relations Law 
It emphasized in Recital (28) that certain matters fall outside both the scope of Art 9 and 
the Regulation as a whole. The Recital states: 
The special rule on industrial action in Article 9 is without prejudice to the conditions 
relating to the exercise of such action in accordance with national law and without 
prejudice to the legal status of trade unions or of the representative organizations of 
workers as provided for in the law of the Member States. 
In the matters covered by Art 9, the applicable law must be determined in accordance with 
other rules of private international law of the forum Member State. The law applicable 
under Art 9 will, however, apply to determine the legal and factual criteria that a trade 
union or other representative body must meet in order to be exempted from non-
contractual liability for industrial action.81 
3.1.3.4 The Connecting Factor: Locus Actus 
According to Art 9, and without prejudice to Art 4(2), the law applicable to a non-
contractual obligation caused by an industrial action is the law of the country where the 
action is to be, or has been, taken. The connecting factor refers to the country in which the 
acts of the workers collide with the interests of the employer, or vice versa. The country in 
question is not necessarily the same as the country in which the defendant acts, as the 
defendant’s involvement may be limited to an act preparatory to the actual industrial 
action. For example, this could be the case when a trade union serves a notice of industrial 
action. The law applicable under Art 9 is subject to displacement by the reason of reference 
to Art 4(2) if the person claimed to be liable and the person sustaining damage both have 
their habitual residence in the same country at the time when the damage occurs. In this 
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case the law of the country of common habitual residence will apply. There is no reference 
to Art 4(3) and thus the law applicable under Art 9 cannot be displaced on the basis of a 
manifestly closer connection to another country. According to Dickinson, the reason for 
including the rule for common habitual residence without the more flexible escape clause 
is a bit confusing, but it seems to be a part of the overall conviction of the framers of the 
Regulation that the rule reflects the legitimate expectations of the parties. However, this is 
not always the case. It may lead to unsatisfactory results, for example, if an international 
trade union based in London and acting from its headquarters organizes a blacking in 
Sweden to a ship operated from Harwich owned by an English company. The law 
applicable to a claim against the union to prohibit the action would be, in this case, English 
law.82 
3.1.3.5 Characterization 
Art 9 applies only to non-contractual obligations. The law applicable to contractual 
obligations, such as enforcement of the contract between worker and employer or between 
a trade union and its members, must be determined in accordance with the Rome I 
Regime.83 As stated above84, a possible interpretation of the Recital 27 is that it forms an 
exception to the interpretation of the concepts used in the Regulation, and thus ‘industrial 
action’ would not be given autonomous meaning.85  According to this view Recital 27 
would effectively mean that the concept should be understood in accordance with the law 
of the country in which the relevant action is to be, or has been, taken.  The law of the 
forum cannot be applied to answer this question as this would not serve the objectives 
identified in Recital 27 and might lead to Art 9 being construed more narrowly or broadly 
than is necessary to protect workers carrying out industrial action in another country. As 
the case Viking86 illustrates, proceedings in a case with an international dimension may be 
brought otherwise than before the court of the country where an industrial action takes 
place and application of any other law than the law identified by Art 9 to determine the 
                                                 
82 Dickinson 2008, p. 438; According to Palao Moreno at p. 123, however, in the scenario where the flag 
would be considered flag of convenience, that law should not be considered closely connected to the 
situation. Overall, he considers that there are no strong reasons for complete abandonment of the ubiquity 
rule corrected by the closest connection test. 
83 Dickinson 2008, p. 477. 
84 See supra, p. 16 note 48. 
85 Palao Moreno, 2007, p. 118. 
86 See infra, chapter 3.2.1 at p. 31. 
28 
 
exact meaning of ‘industrial action’ would reduce abilities to predict the law applicable to 
claims arising out of acts that might be argued to constitute industrial action.87 
Even if this interpretation is accepted, however, the outer limits of what may constitute 
‘industrial action’ may still fall to be defined by reference to the terms of Art 9 and the 
relevant Recitals. These suggest that, at a very minimum, an action must be concerned with 
the relationship between workers and employers. Thus, for instance, an action taken in 
order to protest government policies would fall outside the scope of Art 9.88 It is also likely 
that the concept of industrial action is meant to refer to a legal concept rather than a 
sociological phenomenon. The difference between the two is significant. Should the 
interpretation point out to a sociological concept, it would cover a sociological concept or a 
whole existing social reality. If the latter interpretation is accepted, an industrial action is 
considered to be de facto exercising of freedom recognized and protected by internal rules 
of a country, which the workers and employers enjoy in order to defend specific interests. 
Any other objectives or means of action that do not follow or fall within the definitions of 
this freedom fall out of the legal category of industrial action. A reference to a sociological 
category would be far more extensive by definition. The original amended proposal of the 
EP justifies the special provision as being a fundamental right by nature. This reference 
was not, however, mentioned in later statements. The Council’s Common Position merely 
states that ‘the Regulation now also contains a rule on industrial action in line with the 
proposal of the European Parliament’ and ‘with the aim of balancing the interests of 
workers and employers, this rule consists of applying the law of the country where the 
industrial action was taken’. Dorssemont and van Hoek argue that it is doubtful that this 
kind of an expression would actually refer to a sociological category and thus Art 9 should 
be considered to be restricted to a legal concept — from where a question can be raised —
but which legal order should provide the definition of this concept?89 
The law on industrial action is not harmonized in anyway as the European Community has 
no regulatory powers on the subject. Comparative law research has shown considerable 
variation on what Member States allow as legitimate actions, the most common type of 
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industrial action being undoubtedly the right to strike. Other types of action can still be 
legitimate. For example, the Dutch Supreme Court has recognized go-slow strikes and 
work-to-rule as legitimate forms of industrial action and under Swedish law, a boycott and 
a blockade are considered a legitimate means of action.90 To be added, the regulation of 
strike actions in the UK is completely different in comparison to other Member States.91 
These differences are not merely matters of substance. The differences also exist with 
regard to the source of the law underlying the qualification. In many countries the right to 
strike is laid down in the Constitution, as it is for example in France, Spain and Italy. 
Regulation on a constitutional level is usually applied only to specific forms of industrial 
action whereas other possible forms would then be considered illegitimate. These 
jurisdictions lack a ‘general category’ of industrial action which could be legitimate or 
illegitimate. The legality of an action depends on their classification by the constitution. 
Actions that do not draw their legitimacy from the constitution are subject to rules on 
breach of contract, tort law and even criminal law.92 
Given the phrasing used in Recital 27, it would seem that the Regulation assumes a general 
principle that the law of the country where the industrial action was carried out would be 
applied with the objective of protecting the rights and obligations of workers’ and 
employers. This can be derived also from the rationale of the European Parliament 
regarding the chosen connecting factor throughout the preparation process. 93  Thus the 
preamble would refer to the Member States’ internal rules with respect to the right to take 
industrial action and for the definition the category itself. The phrasing seems quite 
confusing from the perspective of private international law as the admissibility and the 
qualification are one and the same.94 The issue of the qualification in the national conflict 
of laws is typically subject to lex fori but that does not mean that the private international 
law categories are identical to the ones used in domestic law. Classification must take into 
account possible differences between the legal systems involved. Even the concepts that 
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are purely of national origin might be needed to be interpreted more extensively than what 
their meaning is in the sense of the lex fori. 95 
Another important reason which would suggest not to restrict classification on the national 
definitions of the concept is the origin of the conflicts rule. The classification based on 
comparative studies as an approach is particularly valuable with regard to conflicts rules 
that stem from an international convention or some other type of international co-
operation. The terms in conflict rules are given autonomous and universal meaning without 
being restricted to the terminology and established classification of lex fori, lex causae or 
any other particular legal system. Uniform conflict rules would eventually lose their 
purpose if they would be given different scopes depending on their interpretations in 
different courts of different countries.96 As a general rule the concepts used in EU laws and 
in Rome II Regulation must be interpreted autonomously.97  
The primary reason for the autonomous interpretation in EU Regulations is that it is the 
only way to ensure consistent application of the rule in different Member States. If the 
definition of a concept is left to the Member States’ internal rules it is usually stated 
expressis verbis. Autonomous interpretation has been used by the CJEU in the context of 
Brussels Convention and Regulation. The Rome II is also based on the same principle as 
indicated in preamble 11. It would seem possible to consider that the ambiguous phrasing 
in Recital 27 was not meant to create an exception to the general principle. The second 
sentence of the preamble could support this view as well. Thus it is possible to suggest that 
the existing differences in the Member States’ internal rules on the scope of the right to 
take industrial action would be quoted as a justification of the special provision. In this 
sense, Recital 27 should not be interpreted as an exception to the general principle.98 
Again, a comparison of the different language versions could be useful to clarify this issue. 
Under present circumstances, however, such comparisons have not provided any further 
clarification as, according to Dorssemont & van Hoek, the translation of the relevant 
private international law category seems to rely heavily on terminology derived from the 
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national context. Different translations refer to the concept of industrial action in various 
manners. For instance, the Dutch version does not refer to the ‘strike’ but to a generic term 
of ‘collective actie’ which responds to the broad recognition of the right to industrial action 
adopted by the Dutch Supreme Court. German language version utilizes similarly broad 
category of ‘Arbeitskampfmassnahmen’ while the French version reduces the category to 
the two best-known varieties of ‘grève’ (for the workers) and ‘lock out’ (for the 
employers). In comparison to, for instance, the Dutch version the concept used in the 
English version i.e. ‘industrial action’ is narrower as it limits the collective dispute to the 
relationship between employers and workers. Furthermore, the Italian language version, 
‘danni causati da un’attività sindacale’, would seem to reflect an organic view of the 
concept.99 
 
3.2 The Laval Quartet 
Recent jurisprudence of the CJEU provides a rather dramatic excursion to the status quo of 
collective labour rights in Europe at least for the time being. Each case of the Laval quartet 
concerns the consequences of what Joerges calls “social deficit”, or the incomplete 
addressing of the social sphere within the institutionalization of the on-going integration 
project. It is, according to him, possible to outline a somewhat major disjunction between 
the conceptual orientation of the CJEU and the approach promised by European conflicts 
law. This juxtaposition does, however, provide for documentation of the main regulative 
principles offered by the conflicts of law perspective.100  
Before analyzing the case law in detail, it should be kept in mind that the particular type of 
conflict which was before the CJEU in Laval and Viking has not been regulated by the 
detailed transition arrangements in the accession treaties. Also, as it is typical for the most 
of the free movement cases, the actions involved are not directed against Member States 
but against labour unions which are governed by private law, and which traditionally enjoy 
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a high level of autonomy guaranteed by both national and European constitutional 
provisions.101 
In the Nordic countries there is high level of support for self-regulation by social partners 
among all political parties. Employers accept collective bargaining and collective 
agreements as the primary tools for regulating working conditions. The stability of the 
Nordic industrial relations models is bound to this strong ideological and political 
consensus. Even though some legislative restrictions have been introduced, it does not 
change the fact that the underlying general consensus is that the employment conditions 
should be fixed by the social partners through autonomous collective bargaining. European 
legislation is, however, becoming an increasingly important tool for the social partners. For 
instance in Sweden, the Swedish Employers’ Confederation has gone quite far in 
leveraging EU legislation to restrict trade union power. Employers see that legal changes 
are necessary but do not openly challenge the Swedish model. The effects – which shall be 
dealt with in the following chapters – of the judgments are still welcomed as they have 
somewhat weakened the position of the Swedish trade unions.102 
3.2.1 Viking 
The Viking Line operates ferry services between Finland and Estonia (and Sweden). Their 
ships were sailing under the Finnish flag but, due to the decision made by the management 
of the company, were about to be re-flagged under the Estonian flag. The primary reason 
behind the decision was to take advantage of the lower wage costs in Estonia. The Finnish 
Seamen’s Union (FSU) reacted by threatening to take collective action if the process 
would not be stopped. Furthermore, the FSU requested the International Transport 
Workers’ Federation (ITF), with reference to its flag of convenience campaign, to ask their 
members not to negotiate with Viking. The ITF affiliates agreed that only trade unions 
established in the country where the vessel’s owner is based should be able to conclude 
collective agreements that cover the concerned vessel(s). The Viking Line responded by 
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bringing legal proceedings against the ITF and the FSU in the English Commercial Court, 
as the ITF is based in London. Finnish law was applied to the case.103 
The Viking case relates directly to Finnish conditions and there are strong national interests 
involved. The case was eventually settled in a confidential deal between the parties.  Any 
significant reactions to this case in Finland or demands for legal changes related to the case 
have been so far absent. There has been active debate around the judgments, but in this 
respect it is also stressed that they only apply in cross-border situations. In general, the 
impression has been that this might lead the courts to be more willing to grant interim 
jurisdiction in labour law cases dealing with industrial actions.104 
While, in the view of the Finnish employers, the maritime sector is of quite special concern 
in Finland, the Viking case does not appear to originate from any concerted effort of 
employers to leverage EU law in order to achieve reductions to trade union powers.105 The 
aim would seem to be more of a legal measure to further employer interests in a specific 
area of concern in the maritime sector.106 
3.2.1.1 Arguments before the Court 
According to Warneck, there are four different points in the Viking judgment that can be 
distinguished: the right to take collective action as a fundamental right; the scope of 
freedom of establishment and the question of whether employment law is included in this 
scope; the horizontal direct effect; and the proportionality test with regard to collective 
action.107 
The right to take collective action, including the right to strike, is recognized by the CJEU 
as fundamental rights and thus an integral part of the general principles of Community law. 
These rights are nevertheless subject to certain restrictions accordingly with Article 28 of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which indicates that the right is 
subject to “Community law and national laws and practices”. 108 The CJEU has held that 
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the national employment legislation falls within the scope of Community free movement 
law and thus no special treatment is applied. This is, however, debatable. The trade unions 
concerned in Viking argued before the Court that a similar reasoning given in the Albany 
case should be applied in the respective case as well.109 
In Albany International the Court ruled that ‘the social policy objectives pursued by 
agreements would be seriously undermined if management and labour were subject to 
Article 85(1) of the Treaty when seeking jointly to adopt measures to improve conditions 
of work and employment’.110 Even though the recognition was not exactly explicit, the 
ruling in this case effectively meant that the protection of freedom of association required 
that management and labour were not subjected to EC competition law provisions.111 The 
CJEU gave preference to social considerations over economic ones by creating an 
employment-related exemption from EC competition law. A collective agreement 
negotiated by the social partners, by virtue of its nature and purpose, fell outside the scope 
of Article 105 TFEU. In Viking, arguably, the Court could have issued a similar reasoning 
that collective agreements fall outside the scope of the freedom of establishment. 112 
However, one argument about and against the usefulness of this approach would be its 
apparent limitedness. The fundamental rights entitlements still constitute a mere exception 
to the standard application of Community law and cannot provide the basis for a proactive 
effort to enforce workers’ rights.113 The argument established by the Court in Albany was 
intended to be used in connection to competition law and the case did not concern 
industrial action as such. In other words, there is no ‘non-statutory exemption’ from the 
application of the EU free movement rules available when a collective action by labour 
unions confronts the market access or business restructuring of individual businesses from 
other Member States.114 Also, it seems that if EU legislation comes into conflict with 
national implementations of international obligations, for example prior ILO Conventions, 
the Commission’s recommendation to denounce the relevant Convention would in fact 
                                                 
109 Warneck 2010, p. 8.  
110 Case C-67/96 Albany International BV v. Stichting Bedrijfsfonds Textielindustrie [1993] ECR I-5751, 
para 59. 
111 Novitz 2005, p. 227. 
112 Warneck 2010, pp. 8–9. 
113 Novitz 2005, p. 227. 
114 Reich 2008, p. 129. 
35 
 
prevail. This was the case in CJEU’s Stoeckel115 ruling, after which basically every EC 
member state denounced the ILO Night Work Convention (No. 171).116 The Court also 
seems to give much more preference to references of the civil and political rights set out in 
the ECHR over the ones recognized by the ILO which are socio-economic by nature.117  
The opinion of the Court in Viking was clear. The argument here was that the same kind of 
reasoning which was used in Albany case “… cannot be applied in the context of the 
fundamental freedoms set out in Title III of the Treaty” and that “it cannot be considered 
that it is inherent in the very exercise of trade union rights and the right to take collective 
action that those fundamental freedoms will be prejudiced to a certain degree.”118 
The Viking case implies a conflict between two incompatible legal regimes. European law 
guarantees the freedom of establishment but does not govern industrial disputes and refers 
to the national law instead accordingly with Article 153 (5) TFEU. Both sides, i.e. the 
defendants and plaintiffs, presented arguments that reveal something rather uncomfortable 
about the current state of European conflicts law. Joerges clarifies this state of affairs as the 
‘uncomfortable fact that the realm of European law has now almost completely forgotten 
the primary elements of conflicts law.’ 119 
What the Court actually did in Viking, is that it went even further than just ruling the 
collective agreements to fall within the scope of free movement law. The Court established 
that the law may also be invoked against trade unions (horizontal direct effect). 
Traditionally, the freedoms set forth in the TFEU are directed at the level of Member 
States, but now the statement was that the freedom of establishment “may be relied on by a 
private undertaking against a trade union or an association of trade unions”.120 Effectively 
it means that an employer is, from now on, able to take trade a trade union to court in order 
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to obtain a judgment on the legality of any collective action, by merely arguing that its 
action is violating their economic freedoms.121 
In the light of these newly established principles, the CJEU viewed the trade unions’ right 
to take collective action as a restriction on the freedom of establishment. The question was 
then if such restriction could be justified. In other words, certain conditions needed to be 
met. These conditions are often referred as the ‘proportionality test’, which ultimately 
requires that the action possesses a legitimate aim, must be justified by overriding reasons 
of public interest, must be suited to attaining the objective pursued and not go beyond what 
is necessary in order to attain it.122 
The Court concluded that the right to take collective action to protect workers’ interests is 
a legitimate aim. Thus, in principle, it justifies a restriction of the fundamental freedoms 
guaranteed by the TFEU.123 Whether or not the objectives pursued by collective action 
involve the protection of workers interests is a matter for the national courts to evaluate. 
The CJEU does, however, seem to set quite strict guidelines on how such cases should be 
reviewed and judged. The question seems to be if the jobs and/or the conditions of 
employment are actually jeopardized – or at least under a serious threat – because of an 
undertaking or an enterprise. Furthermore, it is significant to establish whether the means 
of collective action actually made it possible for the pursued objective to be achieved and, 
if they did, whether any other (less restrictive) means existed and had been exhausted prior 
to the collective action.124 
The defendants had argued that the conflict actually took place outside the EU, but the 
CJEU was willing to accept the “hint” given by the plaintiff that Finland should exercise 
its competence of constructing its laws regarding industrial disputes “with due respect for 
Community law”125. The result would seem to suggest that this leads to the subordination 
of labour law by the economic law. The thought behind the argumentation of both parties 
is in line with the category of a vertical collision, yet neither made any effort to identify a 
proper conflict collision norm and pressed for a more direct decision. For the defendants 
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the freedom of establishment guarantees of Community law were a non-interest as the EU 
has no competences over industrial disputes and for the plaintiffs the Community 
guarantees were accompanied by a finding that national labour law should be disapplied.126 
3.2.1.2 Evaluation of the Conflict in Viking and the Reasoning of the Court 
If we would consider these issues from the viewpoint of one of the primary operations of 
conflicts law, i.e. characterization, the aforementioned conceptions seem slightly shallow. 
The problem has dramatic constitutional dimensions. From this perspective, it is clear that 
the controversy should not be resolved by a decision that asserts the supremacy of freedom 
of establishment. The jurisprudence of the Court can offer alternatives of which some are 
arguably better. The previously mentioned Albany case is, for instance a good example in 
this respect as well as the Court was ultimately willing to restrict itself and its own 
jurisdiction and thus avoided to label the Dutch collective pension schemes as cartels under 
European Competition law. Instead, the Court sought to establish the co-existence of the 
two legal forms. According to Joerges, this is merely an example of the various 
suggestions that have been made detailing an appropriate conflicts-oriented solution that 
does not derive from the supremacy principle.127 
The much emphasized (by scholars and commentators alike) aspect of the Viking judgment 
is the first explicit recognition by the Court of the right to strike as a fundamental right, 
forming “an integral part of the general principles of Community law the observance of 
which the Court ensures…”128 Joerges suggests that the sentence, which is seemingly 
positive at the first look, actually turns the focus away from the primary conflict which was 
put before the Court. And this conflict, which has everything to do with the perceived 
incompatibility of national regulation on industrial disputes with the EU’s economic 
freedoms, cannot be solved by simple means of transposition of the conflictual relationship 
into a purely European legal realm where it is eventually solved by the hierarchical 
precedence of fundamental freedoms and rights. Admitted though, this transposition of a 
conflict issue into European realm was something actually quite difficult as the Court came 
to this conclusion by asserting that the right to strike relates to the fundamental principles 
                                                 
126 Joerges 2010, p. 393. 
127 Joerges 2010, p. 394. 
128 Case C-438/05 Viking, para 44. 
38 
 
of the EU. As these principles were established (primarily) in order to review legislative 
actions, their application against private actors should be nevertheless considered 
inappropriate.129 
3.2.2 Laval 
The Laval case was referred to the CJEU by the Arbetsdomstolen (Swedish Labour Court) 
15 September 2005. The Latvian company Laval had won a tender for construction work at 
a public school in the Swedish town of Vaxholm and posted their workers from Latvia to 
Sweden in order to fulfil their contractual duty. As a standard procedure, the Swedish 
unions initiated negotiations with Laval with the intention of establishing a collective 
agreement on wages and other working conditions, as these are always negotiated on a 
case-by-case basis in the Swedish industrial relations system. The Latvian company 
intended, however, to take advantage of the lower wages in Latvia and signed a collective 
agreement there. As the negotiations in Sweden failed, the Swedish trade unions blockaded 
the construction site. Their action was further supported with a solidarity action by the 
Swedish electricians’ trade unions.130 By the virtue of Article 9 of Rome II, the claims 
regarding the non-contractual liability of the Swedish unions for damages suffered by 
Laval were subject to Swedish law.131 
Regarding the origins of the Laval case, Bruun, Jonsson and Olauson argue that, even 
though never officially admitted, ”it would seem that the agenda of the Swedish Employers 
Confederation, which had provided the Latvian company with financial support in the 
lawsuit, was to try to establish a principle of proportionality for industrial action within 
Swedish law. “ The strategy was to establish a proportionality test for industrial actions in 
cross-border disputes which could eventually be applicable also in domestic cases. The 
Laval case ended up, however, having a far greater impact on the Swedish autonomous 
collective bargaining model. 132  
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The question of whether the so-called Lex Britannia legislation was actually contravening 
the provisions of the EC Treaty, and in particular the free movement of services, was a 
specific concern in the Laval case.133 Briefly told, the Swedish Lex Britannia basically 
allowed the Swedish labour unions to start industrial actions against the undertaking which 
had not yet concluded an agreement with representative labour union of its employees.134 
The CJEU concluded that the Lex Britannia failed to take into account collective 
agreements to which the companies were already bound in their home state. This led to a 
situation where such companies were discriminated against as they were treated in the 
same way as domestic companies which had not concluded any collective agreement. The 
CJEU, referring to Art 46 EC (Art 52 TFEU), declared that discriminatory rules may be 
justified only on grounds of “public policy, public security or public health”. The aim of 
the Lex Britannia did not fall within this scope, and thus the provision was deemed 
incompatible with Articles 49 and 50 EC Treaty (Arts 56 and 57 TFEU).135 
The Court did not only declare the Lex Britannia incompatible with EU law, but also 
introduced a strict interpretation of the PWD. While the CJEU did, once again, recognize 
the collective action as a fundamental right, it concluded at under the circumstances of the 
Laval case the specific action was illegal with respect to Article 56 TFEU and PWD 
provisions. With regard to the right to strike and the scope of the fundamental freedoms of 
EU, the judgement in Laval follows the same pattern as in Viking. The proportionality test 
was once again applied. Accordingly, the stated reasoning of protecting the interest of host 
state workers against social dumping may constitute an overriding reason of public 
interest, which in principle, could therefore justify a restriction of fundamental 
freedoms.136 The blockading action by a trade union also falls within this objective. 137The 
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Court nevertheless ruled that in this case the action could not be justified by PWD 
provisions or by overriding reasons of public interest.138 
3.2.2.1 Interpretation of the PWD before Laval 
Before the Laval quartet, it was questionable whether the PWD should be understood 
strictly as a minimum labour law directive or a free movement of services directive. The 
difference between these two is significant, as the former aims at protecting the host state 
labour and/or the posted workers, while the latter serves the interests of cross-border 
service providers by limiting the regulatory powers of the host state in relation to posted 
workers. The question arose in relation of various aspects of the Directive. For example, 
Article 3(7) of the Directive provides for the obligation to protect the ‘hard nucleus’ of 
rules and that application of more favourable terms and conditions for workers are not 
prohibited in any way. It does not, however, clarify whether this means that the host state 
may extend conditions providing more favourable terms or that the posted workers may 
rely on their domestic employment conditions that are per se more favourable. Another 
question was about Article 3(10). The host state may extend employment conditions on 
matters other than the hard nucleus to posted workers in the case of public policy 
provisions. The concept of public policy provisions is not, however, defined exhaustively. 
As Malmberg puts it, should the concept be considered more or less the same as the 
overriding reasons of public interest utilized in Gebhard, or should it be construed more 
narrowly?139 
The PWD concerns “importation” of cheaper labour from low wage economies into high-
wage ones and adopts a compromise solution for the conflicts of interest under these 
circumstances. The application of specific working conditions to such arrangements is 
determined in Article 3 (1) of the Directive. The PWD demands, for instance, that the 
legally binding minimum wage level of the host nations is applied for posted workers as 
well. This functions as a collision norm actively protecting posted workers and securing 
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interests of employees within high wage economies, as it ensures that the undercutting of 
wages is restricted in the hosting state.140 
Regardless of the inconclusive questionability of the essence of the PWD, the primary 
function of the Directive was nevertheless commonly accepted to be the determination of 
the mandatory minimum level of protection which the employers must guarantee when 
posting workers to perform temporary work in the territory of another Member State where 
the services are provided. If this is accepted, the directive was to be understood as a 
minimum directive like with every other directive in the social field. The purpose of the 
PWD was thus considered to lay down the absolute minimum working conditions that 
member states have to ensure. In fact, according to the case law of the CJEU141, it was 
presumed that the member states could extend their national labour laws to concern posted 
workers as well, even though this would clearly introduce an active restriction on the free 
movement of services.142 The justification for the extension of national labour law could be 
established with the so-called ‘Gebhard-formula’. In Gebhard143, the Court had ruled that a 
restriction on the free movement of services can be accepted only if it is justified by 
overriding reasons of public interest and is considered to be proportional. The primary 
amendment established by the PWD in the first place was that the hosting countries were 
no longer only permitted but obligated to ensure this certain ‘nucleus of mandatory rules 
for minimum protection’, which was to be defined by (a) rules laid down by statutes or by 
universally applicable collective agreements (for the building sector) and (b) concern 
certain specified terms and conditions such as health, safety, minimum wages etc.144 
In this sense, the PWD should have not prevented member states to provide for higher 
level of protection. The interpretation adopted in Laval changes this aspect drastically as 
the indication is that the host Member State or the social partners are unable to require for 
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better conditions than what is provided by the PWD. What follows is that the PWD 
provisions are de facto limiting the level of protection guaranteed to posted workers.145 
3.2.2.2 The Interpretation of the PWD Established in Laval 
A substantial part of the CJEU’s ruling concerns considerations devoted to the 
interpretation of the PWD. The very essence of this interpretation is stated in the 
considerations 69–71 of the judgment. These paragraphs indicate that a Member State 
which has not determined the minimum wages in accordance with the means provided for 
in the PWD cannot impose case-by-case negotiations at the place of work on undertakings 
that are established in other Member states. The undertakings should be able to ascertain 
the conditions they have to guarantee for their posted workers in advance.146 
Sweden had relied upon Article 3(8) of the PWD to retain its industrial system of 
collective bargaining. General principles of Community legislation also seemed to support 
this expectation. As a general rule, the Member States retain regulatory competences in 
matters that are considered as “matters of public concern” by the Community. Even though 
secondary law, i.e. regulations and directives, might restrict this competence it is only to 
the degree to which Community doctrine of pre-emption in the area of the relevant national 
competence can be justified. According to Recital 22 of the PWD, the Directive does not 
impact “the laws of the Member States concerning collective action to defend the interests 
of the trades and professions”, while at the same time Article 3 (1) (c) states that minimum 
rates of pay are “defined by the national law and/or practice of the Member States to whose 
territory the worker is posted”. The very definition of the pre-emption doctrine draws its 
content from the principle of supremacy, but it does also include the idea that the conflicts 
law functions as a tool demarcating and coordinating Community tasks with national 
competences.147  
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While it might seem reasonable, especially from the perspective of the posting 
undertaking, that the lack of sufficiently precise and accessible provisions make it 
impossible or excessively difficult for the foreign service provider to determine obligations 
to comply with regards to the minimum pay in practice, it should be noted that this kind of 
indeterminacy is inherent to every industrial relations system relying on collective 
bargaining. What the CJEU is thus actually demanding could be considered more or less of 
a complete reformulation of Swedish law in this regard. And all of this due to the 
calculating interests of foreign businesses or undertakings. This is a prime example of the 
very unfortunate aspects of European integration, namely the dissolving of national labour 
constitutions in favour of a more market-oriented one.148  
Barnard suggests that if the perspective of the CJEU is considered, it should be asked how 
precisely did the collective action impose costs which, according to the Court, made it 
‘more difficult’ or ‘less attractive’ for Laval to operate in Sweden. If it is accepted that 
extraterritorial application of Latvian law and/or Latvian collective agreements was out of 
the question, the remaining explanation could be intuition. The Latvian company had 
difficulties of fulfilling a legitimate contract due to the Swedish strike action — something 
that the EU accession had promised in the name of free access to the markets in services in 
other Member States — which ultimately was enough to trigger Article 56 TFEU. The 
effect of the judgment is, however, substantially more excessive. The ruling allows 
challenges to host-state rules which differ from those that apply at the state of origin from 
which follows that a mere difference between the rules is sufficient to constitute a 
restriction on the free movement. This is something the Court has rejected before and 
could potentially lead to near ridiculous circumstances in future. According to Barnard, 
there is no reason why German tourists might not argue that the requirement to drive on the 
left side of the road in the UK hinders their free movement since British rules are different 
from those in Germany.149 
3.2.3 Rüffert 
The Land Niedersachsen (the German state of Lower Saxony) held a tender involving 
construction work at a local prison. The tender was won by a German company which 
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subcontracted the work to a Polish company.150 It was soon uncovered that the 53 Polish 
workers were actually receiving only 46.57% of wages paid to their German colleagues 
working on the same site. The public procurement law of Niedersachsen stated that 
“contracts for building services shall be awarded only to undertakings which, when 
lodging a tender, undertake in writing to pay their employees, when performing those 
services, at least the remuneration prescribed by the collective agreement in the place 
where those services are performed …”. Similar regulations are found in a number of other 
German federal states as well. The circumstances led the Land Niedersachsen to apply the 
contract non-compliance clauses and imposing financial penalties for the company.151  
Because of the fact that the Public Procurement Act (Landesvergabegesetz) of Land 
Niedersachsen referred to collective agreements that were not universally applicable and 
since the scope of the Act was restricted to public procurement152, the CJEU came into a 
conclusion that it did not comply with Article 56 TFEU and PWD provisions. According to 
Warneck, the interpretation of the Court was that Land Niedersachsen did not fulfil the 
criteria for fixing minimum rates of pay as set forth in the PWD. This could be done by 
laws, regulations or administrative provisions and/or by universally applicable collective 
agreements or arbitration awards. As the Public Procurement Act did not concern 
minimum levels of pay and the collective agreement was not universally applicable, the 
rate of pay could not be imposed on foreign service provider.153 
3.2.3.1 The Ruling of the Court 
The Rüffert case was all about public procurement. In Germany, it is not uncommon for the 
Federal States to have clauses in their statutory public procurement regulations that require 
bidders for public sector contracts to provide a commitment that they would pay wages on 
the level determined by (in force) collective agreements. After the Rüffert decision, 
existing collective agreement compliance clauses were no longer enforced as such. There 
has been, however, some development recently that aims to accommodate such clauses 
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with the CJEU requirements.154 In the Rüffert case, the collective agreement compliance 
clauses of Lower Saxony were the subject of the decision. In the wake of the decision, the 
companies no longer had obligations to file a statement of collective agreement 
compliance.155 Afterwards, the majority of the Federal States which had compliance 
clauses prior to the decision have now amended their laws in order to comply with the 
CJEU ruling, although few exceptions remain156.157 
The Court utilized the same reasoning it had previously conducted in Laval. The PWD 
outlines the maximum level of protection for posted workers without the possibility to 
specify a higher level of protection with a collective agreement.158 The need for justifying 
the restriction on the freedom to provide services was once again emphasized. In Rüffert, 
the reasoning of protecting workers interest was not sufficient to justify the restriction, as 
the legislation applied only to the public sector. The Court did not accept the financial 
sustainability of social security systems or the autonomy of trade unions as sufficient 
reasons for a restriction either.159 According to this interpretation of the PWD, it would 
seem that the Member States are unable to demand that companies participating in a public 
tender undertake to pay the level of minimum wages set by a collective agreement in force 
at the place where the service is performed.160 
3.2.3.2 Applicability of the Laval Reasoning 
Regardless of the Court’s interpretation in Rüffert, the situation of the Laval case was not 
directly comparable to the one in Germany. While in Sweden it was generally thought that 
trade unions would ensure that posted workers would be covered by Swedish collective 
agreements, the approach adopted in Germany was different. At the time of Rüffert, the 
Posted Workers Act (Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz) stipulated that collective agreements 
in specific branches, which have been given universal applicability, covered posted 
workers as well. Primarily because of these structural differences, the Laval decision had 
not had any significant influence to the rulings in German courts. As such, however, the 
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legislation in Germany has been subject to a strong political and academic debate as was 
with the Viking case even though the industrial relations systems of Germany and Sweden 
are different with respect to the regulation of posted workers.161 The criticism that the 
decisions have received resemble each other to a large extent with a few points, however, 
specifically made with respect to the Laval case. One is that the decision does underline the 
incompatibility of the Swedish industrial relations system with the PWD. According to the 
German understanding of fundamental freedoms and rights, every form of governmental or 
public power is, in principle, obliged to respect these rights. The CJEU should have first 
assessed whether the PWD took into account the relevant fundamental rights, not the other 
way around by assessing whether the exercising of the right to take collective action was 
within the bounds of the PWD.162 
The logic behind the CJEU’s reasoning is rather confusing. It determines the purpose of 
rules binding the state to collective agreements without any respect to the origins of these 
rules, i.e. the intensive political discussions and the legislative process which have been 
recognized by the German Constitutional Court to be in accordance with the German 
Constitution. While there exists the potential that collective agreements may affect the 
constitutionally recognized fundamental freedoms it is obvious that the German 
Constitutional Court would not accept that the obligation to respect for collective 
bargaining would not effectively constitute an employment protection measure. As the 
opinion of the CJEU might differ, it would need to explain why its interpretation of the 
purpose of German legislation should prevail. European precedence is not self-explanatory 
especially when the legislation on collective bargaining and the PWD concern two 
different legal subjects.163 
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4 Social Policy of the EU, Relevance of the National Structures and the Impact of 
the Recent Developments to the Industrial Relations Systems 
Trade union rights in Europe are recognized in various ways. The rights have been 
promoted with terms such as “inalienable and imprescriptible human rights.” The freedom 
of association is recognized in the revised text of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the European Social Charter recognizes a right for all workers and employers to 
join local, national or international organizations for the protection of their economic and 
social interests.164 Within the European Union, the freedom of association of workers and 
employers constitutes the very foundation of a system to which labour relations that aspire 
to place the values of social pluralism is built on. This is the existing reality in virtually all 
of the Member States. Freedom of association and the rights linked to it, organizational and 
activity rights alike, are a few of the defining elements of the European social model, 
which is actively seeking to address the extremely complex issues of an ever-developing 
society through social dialogue between workers and employers.165 Historically speaking, 
however, the ability of the EU to regulate and to enact on the field of labour law has been 
quite modest.  
The task of upholding collective labour rights i.e. the freedom of association, the right to 
engage in voluntary collective bargaining and the right to strike is, at least for the time 
being, falling primarily to the Member States within the Community area. This is due to 
Article 153 (5) TFEU which excludes freedom of association and the right to strike from 
the EU’s legislative competences. One apparent underlying reason for this is that it has 
been considered as an inappropriate matter for EU intervention, as the systems of 
collective bargaining in the Member States are too distinctive to be subjected to shared 
norms. Thus the matter has traditionally been handed to the discretion of Member States, 
accordingly with the principle of subsidiarity.166 While the EU has no competence to adopt 
a directive dealing explicitly with the protection of freedom of association, there is, 
however, a possibility of indirect recognition of the potentially important role of the ‘social 
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partners’ in managerial decision-making and the implementation of European labour 
standards.167 
 
4.1 Minimalistic Approach to Social Regulation 
Back in 1957 when the Roman Treaties were concluded the prominent thought in the 
European Economic Community was that there was no particular need for a specified 
social policy. The factual danger of ‘social dumping’ existing among the Member States 
was recognized but, rather than actually dealing with the issue, it was presumed to solve 
itself. The idea was that the establishment of a single European Market would eventually 
lead to a gradual harmonization of social policy throughout Europe and thus the focus was 
nearly exclusive in favour of the establishment of a framework to the common market. One 
of the key features included in this focus was the free movement of workers — which 
clearly has had its implications on social policy — but it was considered merely as a 
necessary precondition for the common market. Regardless of the intentions of Arts 117 
and 118 EEC, the Member states remained almost exclusively responsible for social 
policy. The only exception was the recognition provided by Art 119, which introduced the 
principle of ‘equal pay for equal work’ with respect to the relationship between genders. 
This provision was, however, directly meant to prevent using of women as cheap labour 
and thus had very little to do with women’s liberation whatsoever.168  
One aspect which is, according to Weiss, important to remember is that the Community 
has made progress in the social policy area not because of, but in spite of, the Treaty. 
While the unemployment rates climbed in the early 1970s it became obvious that progress 
in social policy is not an automatic implication of the establishment of a common market. 
After the summit of 1972 in Paris the Community was destined to take a few important 
steps in the area of social policy. The pragmatic result which had introduced a detailed 
social action program and a number of directives169 dealing with social policy was, 
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unfortunately, proven to be quite fragile as well. The method relied heavily on unanimous 
support of the Member States. The system broke down in 1980 after the Government in the 
UK had changed and unanimous decision making was no longer a viable option. The 
discussion was revived by the efforts of the Commission’s new president Jacques Delors 
who initiated a public debate on the ‘European Social Dimension’, leading to the 
formulation of European Single Act. The new Art 118a allowed the Community to 
legislate on health and safety by qualified majority. These new powers did, however, 
remain as an exception and the primary means of legislation still depended on unanimous 
decision-making. Thus an effort was made by developing a Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights for Workers, even though it was strongly opposed by the UK. 
These developments eventually formed the foundation to amend the Treaty and introduce 
the inclusion of the social partners to the legislative process.170 
4.1.1 The Community Charter of Fundamental Rights of Workers 
The historically minimalistic approach to fundamental social rights does not necessarily 
mean that there has not been any interest in protecting such rights. Ex Article 136 EC 
(Article 151 TFEU) does not emphasize ILO standards directly but, according to Novitz, 
the two instruments it explicitly mentions reflect their significance.171 The Community 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of Workers declares that the employers and workers of the 
European Community have the right to freedom of association for the purpose of forming 
professional organizations or trade unions of their choice to defend their economic and 
social interests.172 Originally, the 1989 Charter was originally granted only with a 
declaratory status. However, upon closer examination, the effects of the Charter cannot be 
seen as merely declaratory in the historical context. For instance, the Charter is directly 
referred to in the Preamble to the Treaty on European Union (TEU) as well as it is referred 
to in article 151 of TFEU (Article 136 EC). Following the declaration in 1989, the 
Commission also produced a Social Action Programme with legislative proposals based on 
the Charter. The programme was carried out with concerns over social consequences of the 
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established Single European Market, as the social policies practiced earlier did not seem 
adequate in filling the task.173  
Arguably, there exists a level of similarity with other later established European legislative 
instruments, such as the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which 
dedicates the right of freedom of trade union association to all individuals. It could even be 
said that the influence is very much perceivable. The Charter has been forming guidelines 
of interpretation and impacted legislative measures to an extent, and thus, the ‘declaratory 
nature’ of it is very much questionable. The interest and the idea for the protection of 
freedom of association and the protection of workers is there, but unfortunately, it still is 
an observable fact that the collective labour relations also constitute an area that has been 
very resistant to any real influences from the Community law.174 Accordingly, the 
traditional view of EC labour law has been that the minimum labour standards and the 
protection of workers are ensured, but the employment policy considerations, for example, 
have been ignored as being irrelevant to this context.175 
4.1.2 Regulatory Measures: Hard law and soft law 
Regulatory measures within the fields of European social and labour law are traditionally 
classified as either harmonization or co-ordination which, in other words, translates to 
either ‘hard law’ or ‘soft law’ instruments. Historically, the employment regulation falls 
under the latter category. The Member States co-operate within the sphere of employment 
policy, but there have been few to none competences for the Community to regulate 
national labour markets.176 However, it should be noted that the soft law still is nonetheless 
a way of exercising public power. This presumption is especially crucial within the context 
of EU. As Klabbers explains, if a situation is faced, where it is impossible to agree upon a 
regulation, or if it would be difficult to legitimate within the scope of EU’s legislative 
powers, or if it some another way would be undesirable from the national legislator’s 
viewpoint, a soft law instrument should be more advisable. These instruments are often 
applied as resolutions, codes of conduct or action programs. And they all originate from 
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legislative authorities as means to exercise public power. No matter how ‘soft’ the 
resulting application would be. This has clearly been understood by the CJEU as well. The 
Court has not hesitated in applying soft law instruments when it has deemed it appropriate 
enough.177 
One of the ’softer’ competences of reflexive harmonization is provided by the open 
method of coordination (OMC). The purpose of the OMC is explicitly about 
experimentation and learning. The process was first tried and tested in the policies 
supporting EMU, from where it ‘spilled’ over into the field of employment.178 Article 156 
TFEU allows the Commission to ’encourage cooperation between the member states and 
facilitate the co-ordination of their action in all social policy fields’. In contrast to the ‘soft 
law’ competence under Art 153(2)(a) TFEU, which is subject to the exclusion of freedom 
of association and the right to strike by Art 153(5)179, Art 156 explicitly refers to the ‘right 
of association and collective bargaining’. Even though it does not provide for a legislative 
competence, it allows the Commission to engage in research, to produce reports and to 
encourage consultation on both national and international dimensions of these issues. 
Advocates of OMC consider it to offer a ‘third way’ between regulatory competition and 
harmonization, as it can also be used in areas which are not easily susceptible to regulation 
either because of the subject matter or because of a lack of clear Union competence.180 In 
other words, it does justify Commission activity directly related to collective labour rights. 
In fact, according to Davies, Art 156 is only one of various elements in a much broader 
tendency to use ‘soft law’ elements in social policy. The Social Policy Agenda of the 
Commission outlines ‘objectives’ for the EU and member states both and identifies various 
types of ‘action’ to be taken in pursuit of these objectives. The Agenda is partly 
implemented through legislation but majority of actions do not involve any changes to 
existing law.181 
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The OMC is an integral part of the ‘soft law’ approach. The idea is that EU should set the 
goals for social policy and the member states would still have discretion as to how these 
goals are reached. In order to achieve precision to the process, the targets are still set and 
monitored for the member states. There are, however, no sanctions for failure to meet these 
targets and the idea that member states would be able to learn from each other during the 
monitoring process is much emphasized. Regardless of the lack of sanctions, the soft law 
approach has clear advantages. Community law has long been criticized for being rigid and 
inflexible, failing to respond to different conditions in member states and industrial 
relations traditions. The soft law approach addresses, or might even overcome, these issues 
to a high degree. The risk of Member States’ resistance to Community initiatives is 
reduced when these initiatives are not legally binding as it is unlikely that they would be 
considered threatening as such.182 For these reasons, the soft law approach can be 
considered as a ‘smart’ regulatory technique as it maximizes the possibility of the 
acceptance of regulations and compliance with them. It does not, however, mean that the 
technique would not have its disadvantages. The vagueness is one obvious problem as the 
‘actions’ do not involve targets clear enough against which the assessment of the progress 
of the Community and the member states would be possible. Furthermore, the Commission 
has indicated preference to keep the monitoring process at a high level of generality, which 
is clearly reflected in Commission Communication of the Scoreboard on Implementing the 
Social Policy Agenda of 6 February 2003, COM(2003) 57 final.183 
Overall, the soft law competences are not very well suited for setting minimum standards 
as they lack strict enforcement procedures. There is still a role for hard-law harmonization 
in the EU. If a legally binding minimum standard is in place, the soft law becomes useful 
tool in encouraging member states to offer more generous level of protection. For the 
protection of collective labour rights it is not, however, able to take the place of a directive 
setting out minimum standards.184 
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4.2 EU’s Reliance on Member States 
There are a few issues regarding the EU’s reliance on its member states in effective 
protection of collective labour rights. First, the trade unions and employers’ associations 
have a long history of being consulted in the formulation of the social policy of the 
Community and thus the member states are expected to have trade unions and employers’ 
associations that can actually participate in the legislative process at the EU level.185 The 
desire to extend consultation reflects general concerns of the Commission and Council 
with ‘good governance’ and greater involvement of civil society in EU decision-making 
and implementation of its policies. This initiative is thus not entirely a new one, especially 
given the historical role of the European Economic and Social Committee in the EC.186 
Because of Article 154 TFEU the Commission is obliged to engage in a two-stage 
consultation process with the social partners. In the first stage the ‘possible direction of 
Community action’ is to be taken into account prior to submitting proposals in the social 
policy field. Then, if the Commission considers the measure to be ‘advisable’ and decides 
to take action on a particular issue, the social partners must be consulted on ‘the content of 
the envisaged proposal’. At this stage, the social partners may decide to reach an 
agreement themselves through the social dialogue procedure set out in Article 155. This 
allows them to take the matter away from deliberation by the Commission. The agreement 
may lead to contractual relations between the parties, which can be implemented either by 
the social partners at member state level or by a Council decision on a proposal from the 
Commission. An agreement on a matter covered by Article 153187 may be implemented as 
a directive. Vice versa, an agreement on a matter not covered by Article 153 could not be 
implemented as a directive because this would fall outside the powers of the Community. 
This kind of an agreement could, however, be given effect through the collective 
mechanisms provided by the first part of Article 155(2). 188 
The General Court (ECG)189 has pointed out that legislation which is enacted as a result of 
the social dialogue bypasses the European Parliament and thus its legitimacy should be 
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sought from another source.190 The legitimacy depends on the representativeness of the 
social partners which then again depends on the existence of thriving collective bargaining 
structures at the national level. The problem is that if collective bargaining is weak the 
legitimacy of Community law may be undermined.191 
4.2.1 Representativeness at the European Level 
The Commission has determined the criteria of representativeness in its Communication of 
14 December 1993 and reaffirmed it in another Communication of 20 May 1998.192 The 
criteria consists of three aspects which include that the social partner organizations should 
(1) be cross-industry or relate to specific sectors or categories and be organized at 
European level, (2) consist of organizations which are themselves an integral and 
recognized part of member state social partner structures and with the capacity to negotiate 
agreements, and which are representative of all member states, as far as possible, and (3) 
have adequate structures to ensure their effective participation in the consultation process. 
From these aspects, the second one is, according to Davies, of particular interest. The 
Commission seems to determine the representativeness of European organizations by 
looking at the national role of their constituent parts and thus the question of legitimacy of 
the social dialogue at European level depends on the representativeness of the social 
partners within each member state.193 The assumption seems to be that the EU member 
states effectively provide for adequate protection of freedom of association which, 
according to Novitz, is in itself questionable.194 
The primary organization representing workers in the social dialogue is the European 
Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) of which members all are involved in collective 
bargaining and consultation at the national level and most are represented in the national 
delegation to the ILO. Even though its status has been challenged by other representative 
organizations, the ETUC remains clearly the most plausible candidate to represent workers 
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at the European level.195 Nevertheless, the issue still persists as the legitimacy of the ETUC 
is ultimately derived from the legitimacy of national trade union federations. Davies points 
out the problem reasonably well using the UK as an example. Even though the vast 
majority of unions are affiliated to the TUC, it does not mean that it would cover all of 
them. The TUC is basically the organization that best represents unionized workers in the 
UK, and given that trade union members are a minority of the workforce as a whole, it is 
quite hard to argue that the TUC would be a good representative of all workers. 
Furthermore, it is highly likely that the structural problem s will only expand with any 
enlargement of the EU, as some of the recently acceded countries have very low union 
density.196 
For the same purposes, employers are represented by three main organizations: the Union 
of Industrial and Employers’ Confederations of Europe (UNICE), the European 
Association of Craft Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises (UEAPME), and the European 
Centre of Enterprises with Public Participation and of Enterprises of General Economic 
Interest (CEEP). The most important of these organizations is UNICE which consists of 
the members who are the main cross-industry representative organizations of private 
employers in each member state. These organizations have a strong, established position in 
as social partners in their respective member states because of their involvement in social 
dialogue and representation at the ILO. Unfortunately it is quite hard to determine their 
representativeness at the national level because of the fact that it is hard to acquire reliable 
information about the number of firms who are members of national organizations or the 
number of people they actually employ. And, the case remains the same on the available 
data on public sector organizations.197 
It could be possible to answer the question of legitimacy by simply stating that the social 
partners can be representatives even if they do not have widespread membership. For 
instance, ETUC could be considered to act in the interests of both unionized and non-
unionized workers. The problem here would be that a role similar to NGOs is problematic 
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for organizations that are usually membership-based. The interest of the non-unionized 
workers does not always go hand in hand with their unionized counterparts and, if conflicts 
arise, union leaders would be forced to represent the interests of unionized workers over 
other considerations. The same would be true regarding the employer associations as 
well.198 Moreover, it should be emphasized that there are no actual guarantees that all 
interested social partners are even given the opportunity to participate in the EU social 
dialogue process, as the questions of representativeness are solved at the stage at which the 
Commission recommends adoption of a directive giving legal effect to the collective 
agreement.199 
4.2.2 Relevance of the National Structures 
As Community legislation permits implementation of the obligations it contains by 
collective bargaining it therefore relies upon collective bargaining structures at the national 
level. While it can be considered a positive aspect that this approach involves the social 
partners at the national level in the implementation of Community law and respects the 
desire of member states to use collective agreements over legislation as a means of 
fulfilling their obligations, it is nevertheless possible that the social partners might bargain 
over more basic obligations than what was intended to be left to the discretion of the 
Member States. There is no regulation concerning the process by which decisions are 
reached in the social dialogue. The relationship between the residual implementation 
obligation and the collective implementation is hard to determine and, on behalf of the 
Commission, it is particularly difficult to monitor the compliance of Member States’ 
implementation measures when they consist of collective agreements and legislation both. 
The acceptance of implementation through collective agreements may prove to be 
hazardous as the Community cannot reinforce it with proper regulation of the bargaining 
process.200  
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Lack of formality also introduces some other issues, mainly because of the fact that the 
industrial relations approach it reflects seems to overlook the public regulatory aspect of 
these proceedings and appears to slightly inappropriate in a context where the bargaining 
powers of social partners are far from what they would be in their national counterparts, as 
there are no European-level entitlements or practical means to call industrial action.201 
 
4.3 A Short Comparison of the National Industrial Relations Systems 
Every country has a history and legacy of institutions, procedures and customs of its own. 
With respect to legal research, it is essential that the different policies and practices are 
understood in their historical and political-economy context and with respect to actors’ 
strategies as well as domestic and supranational institutions. As every country and their 
respective systems are inevitably affected by external circumstances and internal factors, 
they are under constant change and are best described as anything but static.202 Considering 
this, the relevance of the historical context in which the national structures are formed in 
cannot be overemphasized. 
One of the main features of the Nordic industrial relations systems is their high degree of 
organization of both social partners. The levels of trade union membership are high in both 
the private and public sectors. For instance, in Sweden unionization is above 70% even 
though the number has actually declined in the 21st century. Especially white-collar 
workers, academics and the public sector are highly unionized in all of the Nordic 
countries. Similarly, a high percentage of employers belong to employer organizations. 
Generally, somewhere around 95% of all employees are covered by collective agreements. 
The collective agreements are legally binding to all employees and all employers who are 
members of the signatory organizations.203  
At present Germany is the most industrialized and populous country of Europe and its 
economy has become extensively integrated to the EU. The sudden integration of a 
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socialist economy into a capitalist social-market economy after the unification of the two 
halves of Germany in 1990 created challenges for the political economy which can still be 
seen today. For example, despite the current state of industrialization, and the 
comparatively high level of total employment rates in the unified Germany, the 
employment relations are far less institutionalized and established in the eastern parts of 
the country.204 In comparison to other OECD or EU member states the level of industrial 
disputes has been notably low throughout the last decade.205 
For the past few decades, the UK employment relations have gone through important 
changes. The post-1979 governments led by Margaret Thatcher introduced changes which 
accelerated a tendency to diminish union movement in terms of its size, shape and 
influence in job regulation. After 1997, the succeeding new-Labour governments did not 
reverse these previous changes in general but did, however, introduce foundations of 
minimum standards in the workplace.206 Regardless of these efforts, many of the current 
restrictive elements in UK labour law are directly descendent from the actions of the 
Conservative Government reforms between 1980 and 1993.207  
The means how the government sets employment relations policy and legislation is 
through Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS). The EU and CJEU have 
strong role in the determination of UK employment law. The central union federation is the 
Trades Union Congress (TUC), which has 66 affiliated unions representing almost 7 
million workers in total. TUC determines its policy in annual Congress and between 
congresses this responsibility is delegated to its General Council. The employers are 
represented by national employer associations, from among which the Confederation of 
British Industry (CBI) represents larger employers who affiliate through their employers’ 
organization. These associations are, for example, Engineering Employers’ Federation 
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(EEF) and British Printing Industries Federation (BPIF). They provide support for 
employers on questions about employment related matters and represent employers in 
European Federal Organizations (EFOs). Other associations are, for example, the Institute 
of Directors, the Federation of Small Businesses, the British Chambers of Commerce and 
the Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development (CIPD).208 
Collective bargaining influences the contracts of somewhere around 45% of British 
employees and is much more widespread in the public sector. The public sector forms 
approximately 20% of the total workforce and around 70% of the public sector employees 
are covered by collective bargaining. Otherwise, the influence collective bargaining varies 
greatly and merely 22% of private sector employees are covered. Union membership 
densities are around 16% in the private sector and 56% in the public sector leading to an 
average of 28% in total. UK has a voluntarist approach to employment relations and a 
system of co-determination does not exist. Government ministers and other officials do not 
play an active part in the settlement of industrial disputes in general.209 
4.3.1 The Status of Social Partners 
In Sweden, the right to unionize and the right for unions and employees to negotiate on 
issues concerning employees i.e. hiring and firing, reorganizations etc. is provided for in 
the Co-determination Act (Medbestämmandelagen). Unions are recognized as legal entities 
and their representatives have the right to conduct their union related duties as protected by 
law. The unions are responsible for organizing employee representation without 
independent channels. Officials are, for example, provided for with a right to paid leave 
from employment for union work and with an office to conduct their work. Employees in 
companies and public-sector organizations employing more than twenty-five people can 
have two representatives and two deputies on the board. The decision of such 
representation is made by local unions having a collective agreement in force with the 
employer. In principle, the unions represent only union members.210 
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In Finland and Sweden there are no general restrictions to the right to take industrial action 
when there is no binding collective agreement in force but the parties are bound to refrain 
from industrial action for the duration of the binding agreement. When the collective 
agreement has expired i.e. parties are not bound by a collective agreement they are free to 
initiate strikes and lockouts. The initiator of an industrial action has to give notice to the 
other party and inform the National Mediation Office (in Sweden) or National 
Conciliator’s Office (in Finland). For strikes and lockouts, the approval in Sweden is 
determined by the appropriate board whose decision is not, however, binding. Under 
specific circumstances these decisions have though precipitated the enactment of a special 
law.211 Nevertheless, there are no statutory regulations governing legitimate industrial 
actions. The social partners have established so-called basic agreements instead which are 
in force even if there is no binding collective agreement. Typically these cover, for 
example, the continuous functioning of essential services despite of possible industrial 
action in order to protect people and property. Rules exist for regulating disputes that 
threaten the public interests and rules that are intended to minimize other forms of 
industrial action than strikes, blockades and lockouts. However, there are no rules that 
would require an industrial action to be proportionate.212  
Overall, the social partners enjoy extensive self-governance with very little state 
supervision. In the absence of statutory regulations, social partners have considerable 
freedom in running their internal affairs. Also, there are very few statutory provisions 
regulating the collective bargaining system and, in principle, the partners decide for 
themselves how to operate the system. For example, in Sweden the collective bargaining 
system is somewhat centralized213 and the bargaining takes place on three levels in the 
private sector:  at national cross-sector level between national employer and employee 
organizations, at sector or branch level, and at company level. Legally binding collective 
agreements can be concluded at all levels.214 Collective agreements are signed by unions 
with either an employers’ association or an individual employer. If the agreement is made 
with an individual employer it is considered as a substitute agreement. The agreement has 
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to be in writing and to include certain stipulated subjects, i.e. employment conditions. In 
general, the collective agreements cover matters over pay, working hours and overtime, but 
additional employment conditions such as insurance and holidays may be set as well. The 
agreements are usually applied throughout whole Sweden for a particular sector. Collective 
or substitute agreements signed in a specific workplace cover all of the employees 
including non-unionized workers. Such an agreement should always be signed if it is 
requested even by a single employee. Contrary to a few other countries, however, these 
agreements cannot be extended to other enterprises, i.e. a specific agreement for a 
workplace concerns that workplace per se.215 
The trade unions hold the primary responsibility of supervising the realization of employee 
rights. The role of state inspectors is, in principle, limited to the control of the workplace 
environment. Traditionally, the Nordic model is well described by a spirit of cooperation in 
the labour market between the trade unions and the employer organizations.216 However, 
the ideological and political consensus on self-regulation does not mean that conflicts 
would be impossible. For instance, recourses to different strategies in order to strengthen 
the respective interests of the partners can lead to calls for state intervention in the 
regulation of industrial relations. Usually, when such calls for legislation come from 
employer organizations, the purpose is to restrict trade union power. Calls from trade 
unions are typically requests for further statutory provisions either strengthening their 
bargaining position or reducing employers’ powers.217 
The German system of employment relations is characterized by a high degree of 
legalization. The principle of bargaining autonomy is, however, guaranteed and respected 
by all state authorities and thus there are no governmental interventions at any stage of 
collective bargaining.218 The unions are based on the principle of industrial unionism 
(Industriegewerkschaften) which is why the total number of unions is rather low in 
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comparison to many other Member States. The primary actors at the national level are the 
Confederation of German Employers’ Associations (Bundesvereinigung Deutscher 
Arbeitgeberverbände, BDA) and the German Trade Union Federation (Deutscher 
Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB). Between the mid-1990s and the early 200s the number of DGB 
affiliates was reduced from sixteen to eight by takeovers and mergers. Two of the biggest 
unions form almost 70% of all DGB-affiliated union memberships. The density ratios have 
declined, however, to a level of merely 20% which has led to financial losses and questions 
of legitimacy for the unions. From the employers’ perspective, Germany belongs to a 
group of countries that have interrelated forms of interest representation, that is, general or 
trade associations and specific employers’ associations. There is a strict division of labour 
between these two groups: general associations are responsible for representing more 
general interest while the latter are responsible for social policy issues and employment 
relations including collective bargaining. 219 
Certifications and recognition of unions has never been a major issue in Germany and there 
are only a few general legal requirements concerning unions. In principle, unions must 
promote the working and economic interest of their members’ as well as conditions of 
work. The membership related requirements must be on a voluntary basis and it has to be 
independent from the ‘other side of the industry’, all state authorities and political parties, 
and, it must have a democratic structure. Finally, it must be able to exert pressure on their 
opponent, and they must recognize the law on collective bargaining.220 
The legal base for collective bargaining is found in the Collective Agreement Act 
(Tarifvertagsgesetz). The Act includes the principle of bargaining autonomy and excludes 
all kinds of governmental interference. The primary type of collective contracts is between 
employers’ associations and unions at regional and sector level and the national sector 
agreements have very little importance. Collective agreements are used to cover all of the 
issues related to working conditions, the most important being wages and working hours, 
but they could also cover other issues such as overtime premiums, holidays, training etc.221 
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The certification officer maintains a list consisting of unions and employers associations in 
the UK. The enlisting is highly essential for the unions, as it is required in order to apply 
for a certificate of independence which is needed to apply for statutory recognition under 
the Employment Relations Act 1999. The certification officer does not have powers to 
investigate the affairs of a union in general, but may adjudicate on specific complaints of 
alleged breaches of statute or certain union rules and, under certain circumstances, appoint 
an inspector to investigate the financial affairs of a union. Under the ERA 1999, a union 
can obtain recognition by the employer for collective bargaining purposes if 40% of the 
relevant workforce votes for this and constitutes a majority in the ballot. The same Act also 
established a similar procedure for de-recognition of a union after three years of statutory 
recognition. When the decisions of application related to statutory recognition and de-
recognition are not agreed on voluntarily, they are handled by the Central Arbitration 
Committee (CAC). The CAC also settles disputes between unions and employers when the 
question is about disclosure of information for collective bargaining purposes.222 
There is no general right for the unions of workplace entry in the UK. Employees are, 
however, entitled to be accompanied to disciplinary or grievance hearings by a companion 
who can be a union official. As a part of a lawful picket, union officials are also able to 
attend a workplace as long as they are accompanying and representing an employee for the 
purpose of peacefully obtaining or communicating information, or if they are peacefully 
persuading any person to work or abstain from working. 223 
Collective bargaining in the UK is generally based on voluntarism. Under certain 
circumstances the ERA 1999 does provide statutory recognition for unions, which the 
CAC can also enforce on employers. Regardless of this possibility, most new union 
recognitions have been made on a voluntary basis and the interference of the CAC is rare. 
There is a method for collective bargaining set out in the Trade Union Recognition Order 
2000 which the CAC has to consider when imposing legally binding methods of 
conducting collective bargaining on the parties. Most of the collective agreements in UK 
provide for workplace or enterprise bargaining and there is very little room for pattern 
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bargaining. The procedure of statutory recognition provides for recognition for the 
purposes of wages, working hours and holidays. Voluntary collective agreements have 
wider scope of bargaining and can include, for example, topics about training, redundancy, 
sick pay, equal opportunities etc. Nevertheless, legislated minimum standards apply to all 
employees and workers and cannot be reduced to a level below these definitions.224  
4.3.2 The Right to Take Industrial Action 
Unlike in other Nordic countries, the right to take industrial action is explicitly protected 
by the Constitution of Sweden.  The level of protection does not, however, reach the 
individual employees. The right is reserved for trade unions, individual employers and 
employer organizations. Thus it is only trade unions that can effectively carry out 
collective actions. The rationale behind the rule is the fact that the right to take collective 
action is inseparable from the right to collective bargaining which, by definition, is a trade 
union right. Every worker, whether organized or not, is permitted to take part in official 
actions.225 Furthermore, these rights cannot be restricted other than by law or collective 
agreements. Therefore it is impossible for the government to unilaterally restrict the right 
to take industrial action as such restrictions would require a law adopted by the parliament. 
In Finland there is no explicit provision regarding the right to strike in the Constitution, but 
the law is nevertheless very similar. The section on freedom of association has generally 
been interpreted to include the right to collective bargaining and industrial action. For 
instance, in the Viking case the parties agreed that the industrial action planned by the 
Finnish Union was not illegal under Finnish law. The restrictive element originated purely 
from EU law. In comparison to Sweden and Finland, the main differences in Denmark and 
Norway in this respect are that in the former there is a demand for proportionality and in 
the latter certain restrictions exist on the use of boycotts.226 
Against the historical backgrounds of the Nordic industrial relations systems, the high level 
of scepticism with regard to EU legislation is not unexpected. EU legislation does not often 
permit exceptions in national legislation or collective agreements, but introduces a more 
restrictive element to the freedom of the labour market. The EU regulations are generally 
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seen to be in contrast to the Nordic concept that labour market regulation is primarily a 
concern of the social partners involved. When implementing the PWD, Sweden and 
Denmark had understood Article 3.8 of the Directive227 as a “loophole” in the PWD 
designed to enable Nordic countries to use their own systems. After the Laval judgment, 
however, it would seem that the drafters of the PWD had another purpose: a model, in 
which a Member State may decide that a particular collective agreement should apply to 
posted workers. And based on their misinterpretation, neither Sweden nor Denmark took 
any direct decision to implement this possibility.228 
In Germany, the freedom of association is protected by the Constitution in two variants. In 
the negative form, it means that employees can refrain from joining any interest 
organization and in the positive sense it means that no individual can be prevented from 
joining. The freedom of association is considered to include both the freedom of taking 
collective action and the right to strike. The substantive content of the freedom of 
association is primarily determined by case law, which actively seeks to guarantee a 
balance of power and strength between social partners with regard to collective bargaining. 
The social partners have the right to negotiate collective agreements independently from 
government influence. Any restrictions to the freedom of association require statutory basis 
and justification by other fundamental rights or other rights guaranteed by the German 
Constitution and must also hold up to the principle of proportionality. 229 
Regardless of the high level of legalization in employment relations legislation, there is an 
exception. In Germany’s case that is industrial action. The rules for industrial action have 
been established by major decisions of the Federal Labour Court and the Constitutional 
Court. The unions are the only party actually allowed to provoke a strike. If a strike has not 
been approved by a trade union it is determined as a wild-cat strike, and illegal by 
definition. According to the Federal Labour Court, strikes must be aimed ted to the 
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conclusion of collective agreements. Therefore a strike aimed to achieve goals that cannot 
be covered in collective agreements is also illegal.230 
The situation in the UK is quite different to the one in many other Member States. There is 
no general right to strike. Therefore strikes can, to a certain extent, even be discouraged by 
criminal, civil and administrative means.231 UK common law understands strike action as a 
breach of contract and, additionally, in circumstances of action short of a strike, and 
employee may breach the fundamental term of co-operation implicit within the contract of 
employment. Thus an employee may, for example, forfeit their wages even in respect of a 
partial strike. Employees might also be vulnerable to dismissal, unless certain statutory 
protections apply. Trade unions are generally liable for damages by committing the tort of 
inducing a breach of contract by the employee, and there are also several other torts which 
enable employers and third parties affected by industrial action to hold trade unions liable 
for losses resulting from industrial action.232 Industrial actions executed in pursuit of 
collective bargaining are allowed as long as the action can be framed within the definition 
of a lawful trade dispute. British labour legislation finds its foundations in the first Trade 
Disputes Act 1906 and the legislative basis of industrial relations is mainly contained in the 
Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (TULR(C)A). UK legislation 
provides unions and strikers with a limited immunity from a specific range of common law 
actions in tort. Hence, when a court approaches an industrial action, the starting point is the 
illegality of the action, from where the Court moves to consider the available statutory 
immunities from prosecuting. This immunity is set out in the (TULR(C)A).233  
Industrial actions can be protected as long as the legal requirements are met: (1) the dispute 
is between workers and their employer, (b) a secret postal ballot has been held and the 
majority of members voting have supported the action, and (c) detailed notice about the 
proposed action has been given to the employer at least seven days before it commences. 
Otherwise, there is no protection for industrial actions as these would be considered 
‘unofficial’. Basically this means that, for instance, secondary actions are usually, if not 
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always, defined as unofficial.234 The requirement of a ballot has, however, proven to be 
problematic. For instance, in Shipping Company Uniform Inc v. International Transport 
Workers Federation [1985] ICR 245, the High Court stated that it would have been 
necessary to hold a ballot prior to the industrial action regardless of the fact that under the 
union’s rules clearly stated that it had no individual members. A ballot would have been de 
facto impossible to execute, but the action was still deemed illegal.235 
4.3.2.1 Common Law Specifics 
Currently, there are eight ways in which common law and status regulate and control 
strikes and other industrial action, which are (a) breach of the worker’s contract of 
employment, (b) liability of unions for economic torts of including breach of contract, 
interference with contract, or trade or business intimidation and conspiracy, (c) 
government emergency powers, (d) residual criminal liability (mainly concerns conspiracy 
and control of picketing), (e) a unions member’s right to remove authorization by the union 
for strikes and industrial action held without a proper ballot, (f) the right of a member to 
complain against his union about unjustifiable discipline (TULR(C)A 1992, ss 64 to 67), 
(g) the right of a member to complain of indemnification by his union of individuals who 
take part in industrial action (TULR(C)A 1992, s 15), (h) the right of a member to 
complain on unlawful application of union assets by trustees of unions (TULR(C)A 1992, s 
16).236 
There are no requirements in British law that the aims of collective action are proportionate 
to the harm such an action causes and there are no requirements that the means used are 
proportionate to the objectives. It is sufficient that the stated objectives of the industrial 
action fall within those set out in s.244 TULR(C)A. From the trade union perspective this 
is, however, heavily restrictive, as the requirement for a trade union to justify its action is 
based upon the degree to which it has met its statutory obligations to plead immunity with 
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the Court.237 For the purposes of TULR(C)A 1992, ss 237 to 239, the concept of ‘strike’ 
remains, however, undefined. There are some references by, for example, the EAT for the 
definition of industrial action for continuity purposes in Sch 13 to the EPCA 1978238 and in 
a contractual case of Tramp Shipping Corporation v Greenwich Marine Inc. [1975] ICR 
261, the latter being seemingly more appropriate. In Bowater Containers Ltd v Blake, EAT 
522/81, an individual protest did not qualify as industrial action. As Bowers quotes, the 
Master of the Rolls considered that ‘a strike is a concerted stoppage of work by men done 
with a view to improving their wages or conditions or giving vent to a grievance or making 
a protest about something or other or sympathising with other workmen in such 
endeavours’. Furthermore, it has been quite difficult for the UK courts to identify and 
distinguish a strike from other forms of industrial action. 239 
The actual effect of industrial action on the individual contract itself is rarely, according to 
Bowers, ‘of direct importance’ as the employers do not wish to disturb post-strike calm by 
resorting to courts in order to sue individual workers for these breaches.240 The effect of 
industrial action on the contract is still important, as it indirectly provides the illegality 
basis for the economic torts of intimidation, inducing breach of contract, and conspiracy. 
Thus the employer can seek redress from strike leaders and unions unless they are acting in 
contemplation or furtherance of a trade dispute. The most valuable remedy is still, 
however, an injunction to prevent a strike altogether.241 Regarding every forms of 
industrial action, and especially strikes, UK courts frequently grant injunctive relief where 
the employer has made out a ‘good arguable’ prima facie case and on the basis of a 
‘balance of convenience’ test. Employers in general prefer to take pre-emptive action 
rather than pursue a claim for damages after a strike for two reasons. First, an injunction 
stops the strike action on its tracks. Second, s22 of TULR(C)A places a cap on the level of 
damages which can be awarded against a trade union found liable in tort, so if the 
industrial action proceeds, the employer might not be fully recompensed for the losses. If it 
is the employer that is likely to suffer economic loss by virtue of a strike, UK courts almost 
invariably grant interim injunctive relief to the employer. This state of affairs is something 
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that has been heavily criticized by the ILO CEACR and the Council of Europe’s Social 
Rights Committee.242 
If we turn the focus into other forms of industrial action, the answers would seem to be 
even vaguer. The categories are everything but closed. Bowers explains that for the 
purposes of TULR(C)A 1992, ss 237 to 239, tribunals and appeal bodies have been more 
or less reluctant to limit the interpretation of what may constitute other form of industrial 
action. The question is rather bound and answered with respect to the specific 
circumstances of each case. The phrasing includes (at least) actions of go-slow, work-to-
rule, concerted non-cooperation, and probably picketing of the employer’s premises. 
Typically these types of activities break the contractual obligation that an employee shall 
not disrupt the employer’s enterprise.243 These types of contractual breaches are still not 
the only types of action that may constitute ‘other’ industrial actions. In Faust v Power 
Packing Casemakers Ltd [1983] IRLR 117, the Court of Appeal held that a concerted 
withdrawal of cooperation over admittedly voluntary overtime also constituted an 
industrial action. It was enough that the action was conducted with the intention of drawing 
benefits from management and applied actual pressure. 244 
For lock-outs the ERA 1996, s 235(4) provides a definition for the purposes of continuity 
of service. A lock-out is defined as ‘the closing of a place of employment, suspension of 
work, refusal by an employer to continue to employ any number of persons employed by 
him in consequence of a dispute, done with a view to compelling those persons to accept 
terms and conditions of  or affecting employment’. This definition was applied in Fisher v 
York Trailer Co. Ltd [1979] ICR 834, but it is not fully conclusive. The Court of Appeal 
has taken a broader view after. For instance, in Express & Star Ltd v Bunday [1988] ICR 
379, the Court decided that the definition of a lock-out is not applicable word for word. 
Nevertheless, according to May LJ the definition may indicate the sort of ingredients that 
one should look for. May and Croom-Johnson LJJ both held the question of breach of 
contract as being a ‘material consideration’ when determining if there was a lock-out under 
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the circumstances of the case.245 In his dissention opinion Glidewell LJJ did, however, 
regard the aspect of an employer refusing to let all employees work unless they undertake 
to perform the terms of their contract as a matter of law and thus unable to constitute a 
lock-out. The Court of Appeal eventually ruled that it was correct as a matter of fact in 
determining that the employees were taking part in industrial action at the date of their 
dismissals. The employer was not conducting a lock-out.246 
4.3.2.2 Dismissals 
In the UK, the protection from dismissal in response to strike actions is more limited than 
in other Member States. Both the ILO CFA and CEACR have criticized this because they 
consider that workers should be entitled to take legitimate and peaceful industrial action 
without the threat of dismissal. The employer’s power to dismiss a worker in this respect 
derives from the breach of the contract of employer. There are, however a few limitations 
to this, such as the protection from selective dismissal247 and the time-limited protection248, 
but the worker must be taking part in a protected industrial action to qualify for protection. 
This means an ‘official’ action that will not give rise to liability in tort.249  
Nevertheless, a strike suspends the contract of employment. What follows is that there is 
no right to pay during a strike until normal service has been resumed.250 There are other 
uncertainties as well. Even though the employers’ sue strikers for damages only rarely, the 
calculation of damages has proven to be a major difficulty for the UK Courts. The courts 
have prima facie rejected proportionate shares of overhead expenses as the appropriate 
measure251, but have awarded the claimant for costs of hiring substitutes252. Obviously if, 
for instance, a factory would be running at a loss, chances are that a strike would actually 
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enhance the company’s profitability by reducing wage costs and only nominal damages 
would be possible to secure.253 Overall, the situation is clearly more uncertain and even 
problematic from the viewpoint of the individual strikers than it is, for example, their 
Nordic equivalents. 
 
4.4 Industrial Relations in the Aftermath of the Laval Quartet 
The Laval quartet has shown that the way jurisdiction is regulated has a definite impact on 
the outcome of the litigation related to industrial disputes. As far as possible, there should 
be correlation between the applicable law and the competent Court. This is especially true 
in the field of collective labour law, whose distinctive character and close link to the way 
the domestic labour markets function require great understanding of the way the rules 
operate.254 
4.4.1 The Impact in the Reference Countries 
The newly established PWD interpretations do have a potential of causing widespread 
consequences especially for Member States such as Sweden whose industrial relations 
regimes are based on the autonomous collective bargaining model. The free movement of 
services is supported to the maximum and Article 56 TFEU has direct horizontal effect on 
trade unions. It is quite understandable that the decision caused a shock-wave among the 
public and especially among union-activists in Denmark and Sweden. Sweden ultimately 
placed a Governmental Committee in early 2008 with the intention to find a solution which 
made sure that both the Swedish labour market model would be preserved and EU 
legislation would be fully respected. The Committee published a report in December 2008, 
which was heavily criticized by both sides of the social partners. The parliament did, 
however, adopt certain amendments to the labour law based on the Committee’s proposals, 
including a statutory provision on the right to take collective action against an employer 
posting workers to Sweden.255 
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As the posting employer is not in any way obligated to register, inform, or otherwise notice 
about the posting, the practical effect of the Laval amendments to Swedish labour law is 
that the posted workers are guaranteed with only a level of highly unstable protection. It 
has become arguably impossible to guarantee the rights set forth in the PWD for workers 
posted to Sweden. Also, there are no requirements to be represented in Sweden by a person 
with the right to represent the employer in a collective agreement. The Swedish 
government’s intention was supposedly to reconcile the interest of Sweden in preserving 
the national labour market model and the EU requirement for free movement of services. 
Should the posting of workers become frequent, the preservation of the model as it is for 
the time being, is very doubtful. The amended law does not offer very extensive protection. 
And, it remains to be seen whether the amended law will be accepted by the Commission 
and the CJEU.256 
All of the relevant CJEU decisions do have an influence on the German national system of 
industrial relations. This is most obviously demonstrated by the fact that previously the 
notion that freedom of association and the regulation of working conditions by national 
level collective agreements of the social partners was the dominating principle, and now 
the CJEU rulings have fundamentally changed this perception. Even though the Viking and 
Laval cases did not directly concern Germany, they have triggered a lot of debate on the 
possible consequences for freedom of association at a national level. These cases are, in 
fact, already having a restricting influence on industrial conflicts.257 The Rüffert case, on 
the other hand, demonstrated an impact far beyond what was expected after Laval. As a 
consequence, German public procurement laws were changed. One of the major 
consequences of these changes is that those employers who were paying standard wages in 
accordance with collective agreements are now disadvantaged by the new provisions. The 
adoption of the new type of compliance clauses means that the number of collective 
                                                                                                                                                    
conditions must correspond to the conditions contained in nationwide collective agreements generally applied 
in the relevant sector and the foreign service provider is to be informed that he may be confronted with 
demand for concluding certain kinds of collective agreement. Second, industrial action may be used in 
support of a demand for such conditions to be applied, but the trade unions may only demand conditions 
falling within the ‘hard core’ of the PWD, i.e. minimum levels as regards rates of pay or other conditions 
derived from the central sector agreement. Third, the demands must be more favourable to the posted 
workers than the conditions stipulated by the law itself. Nevertheless, even if this criterion is met, collective 
action is forbidden if the posted workers already enjoy equivalent or better conditions under their contract, 
whether collective or individual.  
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agreements that are, or can be, referred to is smaller. Public procurement legislation has 
lost its function as a supporting element to the autonomous system of industrial relations as 
it now only includes those collective agreements that are generally applicable. 258 
The national executive of the German Trade Union Congress, the DGB, has called for 
reforms. The DGB’s opinion was that Art 3 of the PWD should be modified to clarify the 
fact that the article referred to minimum conditions and that Member States could set more 
favourable working conditions for their workers if deemed necessary. The DGB also 
demanded a limit on the duration of any posting and that contracts which are established 
solely for the purpose of posting abroad should automatically be subject to the legislation 
of the host country. Also, legislation was called to recognize internationally accepted 
workers’ and trade union rights.259 
Overall, the Rüffert decision has caused major problems and, at least, the danger of social 
dumping. Arguably the foreign bidders have a competitive advantage due to the lower 
wages and lower social security contributions allowing them to win more tenders. There is 
a significant difference between the recently adopted compliance clauses and those prior to 
Rüffert, with the new ones typically referring to existing, legally binding collective 
agreements. These agreements have a tendency to regulate only certain minimum standards 
that often are likely to be below actual local wages. Furthermore, these clauses are no 
longer applicable to public procurement in general, but only to sectors listed in the Posting 
of Workers Act (Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz).260 
4.4.2 Alternative Point of View: Laval Quartet and the UK 
Hayes, Novitz and Reed identify three different effects of the relevant CJEU case law to 
the UK industrial relations system. First is described as the ‘chilling effect’ which inhibits 
industrial action. The ‘ripple effect’ undermines collective bargaining, and the ‘disruptive 
effect’ directs against UK industrial relations.261 
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The BALPA262 dispute illustrates the difficulties faced by trade unions intending to call 
industrial action when free movement issues are at stake. In this case BALPA had concerns 
about the terms and conditions under which pilots would be employed by a new British 
Airways (BA) subsidiary, which was to operate out of other European States on US routes. 
BALPA had accepted that the new subsidiary, Open Skies, would offer lower terms and 
conditions to new pilots and recognized a need to establish a separate bargaining unit for 
them. BALPA did not, however, receive the assurances and guarantees they desired in 
respect of career progression and terms and conditions for current BA mainline pilots, and 
thus a strike action was eventually planned. BALPA gave notice of industrial action. The 
response from BA was to claim any strike action would be restricting their freedom to 
provide services and cited the CJEU in Viking and Laval in support of their view and was 
prepared to sue for damages of £100 million for each strike day. BALPA applied to the 
High Court for a declaration of the legality of their action, but eventually realized that 
regardless of the outcome, the case would progress on appeal to the Court of Appeal and 
House of Lords, with the prospect of further reference to the CJEU. Strike action never 
took place.263 
So far this is the only case concerning this issue in the UK. The precise circumstances in 
which the UK courts will regard free movement rights being at issue remains uncertain, but 
the CJEU judgments delivered in Viking and Laval give reason to suspect that this 
assumption will readily be made in cases which have a transnational dimension. UK trade 
unions are uncertain about the potential existence of a new tort – a breach of EU law, 
arising from the direct effect of free movement rights. This would be a tort for which no 
statutory immunity exists under the UK law and hence could introduce the prospect of an 
unlimited damages award against a trade union.264 According to a fairly recent observation 
of the ILO Committee of Experts in 2010 on the application of Convention No. 87 
addressed to the UK, the Committee took the view that there was an infringement of 
freedom of association by failing to provide sufficient level of legal protection for workers 
who were defending their occupational interests.265 
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According to Hayes et al., the Laval judgment restricts the scope of legitimate objectives in 
the context of a dispute over trade union recognition covering posted workers. The CJEU 
considered industrial action aimed at establishing workplace bargaining to enable 
negotiations over minimum wages as illegitimate, as it would make it ‘less attractive’ and 
‘more difficult’ for the foreign service provider to carry out their work in the host state. 
This constitutes a key exception to the basis on which UK legislation establishes the 
existence of a lawful ‘trade dispute’. The relevant statutory provision make reference to an 
entitlement to take industrial action which relates primarily to the recognition by 
employers or employers’ associations of the right of a trade union to represent workers in 
negotiation or consultation or other procedures relating to terms and conditions of 
employment. The employers of posted workers will, as it seems, be exempt from this 
fundamental tenet of UK labour law.266 
In terms of scale and pure numbers, it would first seem that the PWD poses only a small 
problem for the UK. However, there are four times more EU workers in Britain than there 
are Britain’s working elsewhere in Europe. And there is, without going into further details, 
mounting evidence of systematic abuse of foreign workers in large sectors of the UK 
employment market.267 It is important to recognize that the CJEU case law in Viking, 
Laval, Rüffert and Luxembourg applies to the integration of employment protection for 
posted workers within the labour systems of host states. The UK Government is unlikely to 
ratify ILO Convention No. 94 in the near future, but at the same time is to a large extent 
insulated from the contradictions which arise in trying to align the decision in Rüffert with 
public procurement obligations in international law. However, the UK government has not 
indicated any reactions to public concerns relating to worker exploitation, the structural 
impact of migrant workers on the labour market and obligations to promote gender 
equality.268 
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5 The Right to Strike as an International Human Right 
The Laval quartet affects directly the scope within which collective actions are allowed. 
The wage and employment conditions against which an industrial action can be taken are 
limited in a way that is not exactly natural in Nordic countries. The Laval judgment makes 
it clear that there can be no collective bargaining with EEA companies when workers are 
posted to Sweden. A trade union cannot demand that a foreign service provider would 
enter into bargaining on the conditions applicable as it would present an obstacle to the 
free movement of services. Given that all forms of trade usually require some level of 
negotiation and that the restrictions emanating from EU legislation have an impact on areas 
in which collective bargaining can take place their implications should be questioned. This 
is especially true with regard to ILO Conventions 87 and 98.269 
If the design and concept of the fundamental freedom of association at the national levels 
is compared with the acknowledged European freedoms it should be taken into account 
that the ECJ has not yet sufficiently determined what is meant by freedom of 
association.270 Even though the parliaments in Denmark and Sweden have amended their 
labour laws adjusting them to their interpretation of the current legal situation, there still 
exists a certain amount of uncertainty. Regarding this, Bruun et al. have presented the 
following question: does the fact that the Lisbon Treaty has entered into force render the 
CJEU judgments obsolete? Could it be possible that Advocate General Cruz Villalón is 
right in his opinion and the situation has changed since Art 9 TFEU and the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights became primary law? The CJEU has not yet had to give an answer to 
these questions.271  
The right to take industrial action is, by definition, a fundamental right recognized in 
several international instruments.272 If we are determined to examine what the content and 
meaning of the concept of industrial action is, the international law binding on the Member 
States should be a natural starting point as it provides the very basis of the relevant 
standards. This is not to say, however, that comprehending the variety of regulations and 
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principles concerning the right to strike, or more precisely the freedom of association from 
which the former originates from, would be straightforward and easy. As will be 
demonstrated in this chapter, the issue encompasses both a high level of political 
sensitivity in the historical context and a complexity of interactions between various 
international instruments. 
 
5.1 Labour Rights in a Shrinking World 
Workers’ rights are human rights, yet the international human rights movement devotes 
little attention to the rights of workers. At the same time, trade unions and labor leaders 
rarely enlist the support of human rights groups for the defense of workers’ rights. A 
regrettable paradox: the human rights movement and the labor movement run on tracks 
that are sometimes parallel and rarely meet.273 
The opening words of the classic essay by Virginia A. Leary remain true today. As she 
further continues, the catalogue of international human rights that includes work-related 
rights is broad: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, and the conventions adopted by the International Labor Organization.274 
One of the many effects of globalization at the international level that are often considered 
undesirable is the active pressure that is placed for the employers. These developments 
have, in my opinion, a few general similarities to the issues introduced by the EU’s 
enlargement process. This is, for instance, due to competition on wages and terms of 
employment. Workers are the actual party suffering the most under such developments. 
This is due to the unfavourable consequences from the adverse effects of regulatory, or 
even more likely, deregulatory competition which is exercised by states and designed to 
attract investments. Developments like this are usually even further enhanced by sudden 
changes in economy, such as the ‘credit crunch’ related to the global economic crisis of the 
early 21st century. The crisis suppressed the available credit in the markets and thus had 
tremendous effect for the capacity of available private capital to invest. Obviously, when 
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there was no private capital available the states were facing an issue of having no investors 
for their financing. If labour relations are considered, every global recession always leads 
to, at best, restructuring of private and public enterprises. And in the worst case, recessions 
can lead to rather unfortunate circumstances where the amount of lay-offs is significantly 
increased. Either way, access to the labour market is considerably obstructed as the terms 
and conditions of work have a tendency to be diminished nevertheless.275 
What has also been commonly accepted is that globalization significantly accelerates the 
interdependence development between states. The policies of one state are becoming more 
and more likely to have impact outside their territories. The capacity of a state to respect 
human rights, including labour rights, is definitely affected when foreign actors are 
introduced.276 Non-state actors have their part to play in the process. Particularly the ones 
that benefit the most of globalization and the ones that are directly born out of it: 
multinational corporations and international organizations277. The concerns about the 
policy autonomy of states and their ability to control aspects of labour rights within their 
borders are emphasized as the international instruments, such as the Covenants of the 
United Nations, primarily bind states and it is only states that can be held accountable for 
any violations.278 Nonetheless, the states are not the only actors that form, operate and 
engage in supranational (employment) relations on the global level. 
From the perspective of labour rights the most important UN core human rights treaties are 
without doubt the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Their 
provisions offer the most detailed and specific coverage on labour regulation and, more 
importantly, they are not limited to any particular groups such as minors or migrant 
workers. Furthermore, an important note is that discrimination is not a prerequisite for their 
appliance as it is with some other conventions, although both Covenants do prohibit 
discrimination in relation to the enjoyment of labour rights.279  
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Both ICCPR and ICESCR make a direct reference to the ILO Convention No 87 on the 
freedom of association. Article 8(3) of ICESCR is of particular importance. This is due to 
the fact that the ILO Convention allows limitation on the rights of the members of armed 
forces and the police but, unlike the ICESCR, it does not include government 
administration. Thus, a state restricting the ability to join and form unions for public 
servants would be not only in breach of the rights stated in ILO Convention No 87, but 
with the Covenant as well.280 
 
5.2 Social Rights as Human Rights 
The idea of labour rights as human rights is inevitably a developing concept. For an 
evolving ideology it is fairly difficult to find two commentators providing an exactly alike 
opinion. Different theories such as religious, liberal, libertarian and socialist are merely 
examples that highlight this discretion. Tensions between and within different schools of 
thought have had a significant influence on the standards of what we consider as civil and 
political rights in distinction to social and economic rights today. In particular, the effect 
can be seen in the separation of individual rights from the collective rights. Historically 
speaking, this categorization has been debated a lot, but generally accepted. However, as 
Novitz and Fenwick suggest, this has also been somewhat confusing. That is, at least from 
the standpoint of applying human rights concepts in the interests of workers’. 
Controversially enough, the division still has permanently influenced the western liberal 
legal culture and the international labour rights.281 
Transnational flows of goods and services are enabled by legal and institutional 
architectures consisting of the rules of contract and commercial law facilitating 
international trade and protecting property rights. The last few decades have also 
introduced regulation aiming to ensure the free flow of economic resources across borders 
and to the removal of regulatory barriers to trade. In general this type of regulation intends 
to success in the integration of national markets, but it also creates an additional market 
mechanism at the same time: a market for legal rules in which different regulatory systems 
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compete with each other. As the states compete from the resources the quality and 
substance of the regulation they provide becomes an aspect of comparative economic 
advantage. And the effects of such competition can be seen directly in the social welfare 
systems in particular as they are creations of the same nation states.282 
The economic, social and cultural entitlements, which were indeed debated over as early as 
in the seventeenth century, do not principally have similar position under the traditional 
human rights discourse as their civil and political counterparts. For workers and 
organizations seeking to pursue or protect their interests over collective bargaining or 
industrial action, i.e. collectively, the issue has always been quite straightforward. 
Traditional human rights discourse has not been, in many circumstances, sufficient in 
protecting these interests.283 
The civil and political rights, in the sense of their liberal conception, can be understood as 
rights which operate in a way quite different to their economic, social and cultural 
counterparts. Traditionally, these rights are seen as acknowledgements for each individual 
person, which enact on a way of creating a personal space, or a ‘sphere’, within which 
every individual is free from the control of the state. By the traditional definition these are 
considered as negative rights, i.e. rights that are not to be subjected to any state action that 
would interfere with their existence but do not require any positive action by states in a 
strict sense. In contrast to the negative rights, the economic, social and cultural rights are 
considered as positive rights. These are considered as entitlements to individuals as well 
but, rather than prohibiting state interference, the rights require positive action by states in 
order to be implemented. The provision of social goods by states and the need for state 
action is the primary outline when specifying the definition of positive rights.284 
 
5.3 ICCPR and ICESCR Labour Provisions 
The relevant provisions regarding labour rights in the ICESCR are articles 6–10 and 12. 
The right to work is guaranteed by article 6. The right to just and favourable conditions of 
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work is recognized in article 7. Article 8 states the right to join effective trade unions, 
which is an important aspect in balancing the relationships with employers and employees. 
Article 9 recognizes rights to social security which, accordingly, should include 
compensation rights and unemployment benefits as well. In general, article 10 guarantees 
protection and assistance for families and children, and the sub-provisions highlight these 
details with a right of paid maternal leave in 10(2) and protection against the exploitation 
of young people in employment context in 10(3). Article 12 obliges states parties to take 
measures in protecting the right to the highest attainable standard of health including 
industrial hygiene in paragraph 2(c) and to combat occupational diseases in paragraph 
2(b).285 
The ICCPR offers somewhat narrower protection of labour rights within the relevant 
provisions. Article 8 absolutely prohibits slavery and servitude as well as it prohibits 
forced labour. However, it allows some degree of derogation in the form of ‘hard labour’ 
designed to form a part of normal civic obligations.286 Article 22 guarantees freedom of 
association, and is considered to include the right to form and to join trade unions. 
Therefore, this provision actually overlaps to some extent with article 8 of ICESCR in this 
respect. Finally, article 25(c) offers some amount of protection for the right of employment 
in the public sector.287 
5.3.1 Evaluation of the ICCPR and ICESCR Obligations 
According to article 2(1) of the ICCPR the state parties undertake “- - to respect and to 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights 
recognized in the present Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth 
or other status.”288 Thus, the states are required, for example, to combat any form of 
forced labour directly under the provisions of article 8.289 
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However, the ICESCR does not offer a similar level of protection despite the fact that it is 
clearly the more important Covenant in relation to labour rights. The obligation provision 
in article 2(1) of ICESCR reads: “Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to 
take steps, individually and through international assistance and co-operation, especially 
economic and technical, to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present 
Covenant by all appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative 
measures.”290 
This phrasing does not directly oblige state parties to guarantee the rights provided by the 
ICESCR, but rather requires the states to ‘try hard’ in protecting the provided rights. The 
state parties are supposed to progressively increase the enjoyment of these rights 
accordingly in relation with available resources. In contrast to a direct requirement for state 
parties to ensure the protected rights, it is significantly harder to uncover any violations of 
the ICESCR with this kind of a soft obligation. Arguably it makes it also easier to evade 
findings of violations as it is usually easier to determine whether or not a state has 
protected provided rights to a sufficient degree than it is to determine whether or not the 
actions or measures taken by a state in order to meet the kind of ‘appropriate means of 
attempt’ requirement. In other words, it is difficult to prove accountability for obligations 
if it cannot be determined if any obligations have actually been breached.291 
The reason behind the fact that the ICESCR offers weaker terms of state obligations than 
ICCPR may be found in the historical conceptualization of positive and negative rights. In 
the western liberal tradition, the economic, social and cultural rights are considered to give 
rise to positive duties in contrast to civil and political rights which are considered as 
negative by nature. This is clearly demonstrated by the main argument of the UN General 
Assembly for drafting two Covenants back in 1951 in the first place. It was exactly the 
enforceability and justiciability of civil and political rights that separated them from the 
economic, social and cultural rights in the debate.292 As mentioned above, positive rights 
require actions for fulfilment, while the negative rights are met by simply refraining from 
certain actions. Obviously, it is very much more effortless to refrain from action, which 
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effectively means doing nothing, than it is to undertake positive acts or responsibilities.293 
Upon closer examination of the justiciability of both Covenants in a historical context, this 
has been quite obvious. The ICCPR rights have always been justiciable, which has long 
been confirmed and promoted by the Optional Protocol (OP) to the ICCPR. The OP allows 
individuals to submit complaints against state parties to the Human Rights Committee 
(HRC). No mechanism allowing individuals to submit claims against states parties for 
breaches of human rights violations existed under the ICESCR, until quite recently. Thus it 
has been traditionally a long-term conclusion that the economic, social and cultural rights 
are indeed non-justiciable and inappropriate for judicial determination.294 
However, today the scope of the reporting procedures, which are the main tools for 
monitoring compliance with the Covenants, has notably broadened. The UN General 
Assembly adopted an Optional Protocol to ICESCR on 10th December 2008, which 
provides a similar complaint system for individuals as does the one under the OP of 
ICCPR. The OP opened for signature on 24 September 2009 and as of February 2014 the 
Protocol has 45 signatories and 12 state parties. It entered fully into force on 5 May 2013. 
From the viewpoint of labour rights, these developments are welcome as the consensus on 
the matter clearly signals a certain change in the previously held ideas. Economic, social 
and cultural rights are not inherently non-justiciable.295 
5.3.2 The Substantive Content of the ICESCR Rights 
Even though the provisions of ICESCR are progressive and thus not as direct and 
demanding as the ‘immediate’ obligations provided by the ICCPR, these rights are still de 
facto obligations with meaningful content. Therefore, any retrogressive measures by state 
parties are, per se, violations. Naturally, such measures might be legitimate under certain 
circumstances. Deliberate retrogression might be necessary in order to reallocate resources 
to improve the enjoyment of one social right in favour of another. However, states do need 
to be able to demonstrate such necessity. Furthermore, there are also some immediate 
elements in the ICESCR. Such are, for instance, the exclusion of arbitrary discrimination in 
article 2(2). The CESCR has confirmed that this duty is, in fact, immediate. Implementing 
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ICESCR rights is thus never possible in a discriminatory manner. According to Joseph, any 
discrimination in regard to the rights stated in ICESCR is actually actionable under the 
ICCPR and the OP. States cannot give preference to certain segments of society when 
adopting these rights.296 
There are also minimum essential levels for each ICESCR right. This interpretation was 
laid down by CESCR in its General Comment 3 on ‘The Nature of State Party 
Obligations’, where it is confirmed that there are presumptive, immediate obligations for 
states parties to provide ‘minimum core’ levels of ICESCR rights. Without exception, the 
states bear the burden of proof that such levels are not met due to true inability rather than 
unwillingness or neglect.297 
The ICESCR does, however, surpass the level of obligations in comparison to ICCPR in 
one specific area. This is with the reference to the international assistance and cooperation. 
The CESCR has confirmed that cooperation for development and the realization of 
ICESCR rights is an actual duty for all States parties. This aspect of international 
expansion of obligations might set requirements for states to enact positive actions to 
improve the realization of economic, social and cultural rights in other states especially 
when the other state has no means or is unable to provide for minimum core rights itself.298 
5.3.2.1 The Right to Strike 
Within the sphere or economic, social and cultural rights, the trade union rights are 
protected under article 8 of ICESCR, which contains a specific clause of the right to strike. 
Article 8 with reference to the paragraph 1(d) reads: “The States Parties to the present 
Covenant undertake to ensure the right to strike, provided that it is exercised in conformity 
with the laws of the particular country.” While such right is recognized and protected by 
many national laws and regional treaties, the details of national regimes vary from 
jurisdiction to another. The ICESCR provision remains as the only explicit and direct 
recognition of the right to strike in any global human rights instrument.299 Neither of the 
two major ILO conventions on freedom of association refers to the right to strike as such. 
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The ILO supervisory bodies have, however, held that the right to strike is one of the 
essential means available to workers and their organizations for promoting and protecting 
their economic and social interests.300 Even though most strikes are, in principle, exercised 
by trade unions in a collective manner, the right to strike is stated clearly as an individual 
right in the Covenant. Conclusively, the provision should thus cover the protection of an 
individual worker in case of a dismissal based on exercising the right to strike. The article 
is a hybrid provision that includes both individual and collective rights at the same time.301 
From the very beginning, article 8 has been controversial. During the preparations it was 
first argued and debated over whether the right to form unions should be included in the 
ICESCR at all. This was based on the fact that freedom of association was already 
protected by the ICCPR. It was further argued, that since this right would target only a 
specific group of people and not everyone, it is not actually a human right at all, at least 
technically speaking. It was finally adopted after significant compromises, and as 
Kaufmann suggests, “coherence is not one of its biggest merits.”302 
At first glance, it is possible to deduce that the paragraph 1(d) could de facto prevent strike 
actions in certain circumstances, as the laws of a particular country might prohibit strikes. 
However, this is not the case. The CESCR has laid down Concluding Observations that, 
for example, have expressed concerns that Mauritian laws were operating in a way that 
would actually prohibit most strikes, and that Russian authorization requirements for strike 
actions were set at an unreasonably high levels. This interpretation ensures that the right to 
strike contains substantive content and thus it cannot be unreasonably constrained by any 
municipal laws.303 It can be also argued, that the right to join and form trade unions is an 
integral part of the freedom of association found in article 22 of ICCPR, which is not 
subject to progressive realization. Thus, the ‘restriction’ of article 2(1) would be 
inapplicable. This is based on the phrasing which obligates the states to ensure and not 
merely to recognize the rights stated in the article. With this interpretation, article 8 would 
be self-executing as well as justiciable.304 
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5.3.2.2 JB et al v Canada 
Historically speaking, the difficult nature of the freedom of association as a fundamental 
right, especially with reference to the evident overlapping between the ICCPR and 
ICESCR is emphasized in the HRC’s case of JB et al v Canada305. In this case, a number 
of trade union members submitted an OP communication to the HRC. The authors of the 
communication referred to a prohibition to strike in the Province of Alberta in Canada 
under the Alberta Public Service Employee Relations Act of 1977 and claimed that such 
prohibition constitutes a breach of article 22 of the ICCPR. While both Covenants 
guarantee the freedom of association and the joining to and forming of trade unions, the 
ICCPR does not explicitly mention the right to strike, nor is it mentioned in the travaux 
préparatoires. The majority of HRC deduced that the right would need to be implied from 
the words of article 22, and further noted that the explicit inclusion in the ICESCR actually 
indicated that it was not a fundamental aspect of the right considered. Therefore, as the 
opinion of the majority, the case was decided inadmissible.306 
According to Leary, the opinion of the majority was, however, unpersuasive and its 
credibility questionable as the very forceful dissenting opinion was signed by five of the 
most respected members of the Committee. 307 In their opinion the HRC minority stated 
that it was rather unsurprising that the right to strike was absent from article 22 of ICCPR 
and from the travaux préparatoires as well. The article supposedly guarantees a general 
freedom of association, which should extend far beyond trade unions and thus the absence 
of a specific reference to a strike actions should have been considered inconclusive. The 
fact that the spoken right is included in the ICESCR does not imply that it is absent from 
the ICCPR. Especially when the detailed specificity of the former and the intended 
generality of the latter are taken into account it would have actually been inappropriate to 
include a specific reference to the right to strike in the ICCPR. The question of whether or 
not article 22 protects the right to strike should have been most certainly admissible.308 
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Furthermore, the minority correctly noted that the right to strike is protected under the ILO 
Convention No 87 on Freedom of Association and the Right to Organize. In fact, the ILO 
had already deemed the Alberta law relevant to the case to be in breach of the Convention 
No 87. In the opinion of the minority, there was no reason to interpret article 22 in a 
different manner that was already deemed by the ILO in a comparable consideration. The 
ILO Convention No 87 does not explicitly include a right to strike, but it is considered as 
an essential activity by which the workers can protect their interests and which is one of 
the prime functions of trade unions. With reference to the safeguard clause of article 22(3), 
which basically states that article 22 should be interpreted in line with ILO Convention No 
87, it would seem almost irrational not to accept the minority opinion.309  
The rights stated in the ICCPR article 22 and the ICESCR article 8 are similar, but differ 
substantially in their scope. In terms of interests that can be promoted by trade unions, the 
ICCPR provision is significantly broader. It is meant to promote the fact that the freedom 
of association is not only an economic right, but also a political and civil right. It has a 
unique threefold character, which underlines the fact that it is an indispensable part of a 
democratic society. Political interests cannot be nourished without the community and 
contact with others, and it is the very reason why the freedom of association can be found 
in both Covenants. Failure to include it in ICCPR could have given the impression that it is 
not a civil right. The ICESCR promotes the aspect of protecting economic and social 
interest, while the ICCPR underlines the general interest of everyone.310 
Despite the outcome of the JB et al v Canada, HRC has later actually indicated concerns in 
Concluding Observations over restrictions on the right to strike. And these are exactly 
stated with a direct reference to article 22 of ICCPR. For instance, the HRC stated 2004 
that (then) recently founded Lithuanian regulations which primarily restricted the right to 
strike may amount to a violation of article 22311. It is difficult to determine the meaning of 
this approach, especially when similar ‘serious concerns’ were already expressed earlier 
over a Chilean law imposing a general prohibition to the freedom of association as well as 
the right to strike.312 It could be concluded that, following the criticism, the HRC does now 
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recognize the right to strike as an inalienable part of article 22. However, it is still factually 
inconclusive whether or not the HRC has really departed from the precedent in JB et al v 
Canada.313 
 
5.4 The ILO as a Foundation 
The International Labour Organization (ILO) was established in 1919 and thus it 
significantly predates most other international human rights instruments, which have 
materialized after WWII in general. It is possible that this is one of the reasons behind the 
fact that labour rights have a tendency to exist in a separate sphere among other 
international human rights bodies at the global level. Even though it can be suggested that 
the international human rights movement initiated with the founding of ILO and the 
adoption of first international labour conventions314, it is not very far-fetched to state that 
when the labour rights are inalienably connected with the ILO the UN bodies have had the 
chance and ability to concentrate more specifically on other human rights issues in need of 
attention. Naturally, the UN human rights treaties do recognize and protect labour rights 
but, up to date, any contributions in actually developing these rights have been more or less 
modest.315 
The ILO was founded on the grounds of utilizing the language of human rights and social 
justice to justify its existence. In addition, the founding also was evidently a direct 
response to concerns by states that domestic labour market regulations would increase 
prices of production and thus introduce competitive disadvantages against countries that 
lack the regulations of protecting workers interests. International labour law was welcomed 
as a form of fair competition as it acted as an intermediary between employers and 
between countries.316 The freedom to form unions was first stated in the ILO Constitution 
of 1919 and the importance of labour unions was further emphasized in the ILO 
Convention No 26 of 1928. These rights were even more stressed over after the WWII, as 
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the unions were considered as safeguards against dictatorships.317 The freedom of 
association was reaffirmed in the 1944 ILO Declaration of Philadelphia and codified by the 
adoption of ILO Conventions No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organize Convention 1948 and No. 98 on the Right to Organize and to Bargain 
Collectively, 1949. Perhaps most importantly, the ILO Constitution implies an explicit 
commitment to freedom of association by the virtue of ILO membership regardless of 
whether the relevant ILO Conventions on freedom of association have been ratified. 318 
Respect for freedom of association and collective bargaining is also included in the ILO’s 
Declaration on Fundamental Rights and Principles at Work of 1998 which is also binding 
for the states as part of ILO membership. Despite the fact that ILO has not agreed on a 
Convention on the right to strike, it is nevertheless accepted as a key aspect of collective 
labour rights in the ILO’s practice.319  
Recently, given that both labour law theory and labour law practice have evolved quite 
considerably, the approaches adopted by ILO have been quite symbolic in comparison. 
With respect to the 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, the 
human rights aspects are further emphasized with the reformulation of the ILO’s traditional 
standards and principles into modern day language. The reformulation established – or 
confirmed – the four ‘core labour standards’: the freedom of association and collective 
bargaining, the elimination of forced labour, the abolition of child labour, and the 
elimination of discrimination in employment.320 
5.4.1 ILO Conventions and Recommendations 
The traditional mechanisms of ILO in protecting workers’ rights are conventions and 
recommendations. Briefly introduced, these include the Committee of Experts on the 
Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR) which primarily considers 
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government reports, and the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards which 
is a standing committee of International Labour Conference.  
In contrast to other established core labour rights, the right to freedom of association 
enjoys an exclusive supervisory mechanism: The Committee on Freedom of Association 
(CFA). The introduction of Conventions No 87 and 98 necessitated a mechanism which 
would be better suited for responding to complaints related to the suppression of trade 
unions and restrictions on industrial actions. The Committee of Experts reviews 
governments’ compliance with respect to their obligations in ratified Conventions but does 
not examine specific incidents. Since the ILO membership obligates respect for freedom of 
association by itself it was also expected that complaints may arise in member States that 
had not ratified Conventions Nos 87 and 98.321 The subject was debated over the early 
1950s and eventually ended up in a proposal which reflected the tripartite composition of 
the Governing Body. After discussions held with ECOSOC in November 1951 the 
Governing Body established the Committee on Freedom of Association.322  
Regardless of whether a state has adopted or ratified the relevant freedom of association 
conventions, the CFA examines complaints submitted by governments, workers or 
employers on violations of trade union rights by states. The CFA is a tripartite body 
comprised of members and working under the supervision of the ILO Governing Body, 
and it also enacts by recommending action to governments through the Governing Body.323 
The CFA has actively and repeatedly criticized governments, for instance, of not 
sufficiently respecting collective bargaining as an instrument of negotiating the terms and 
conditions of public sector employment, or in other words, the employment conditions of 
their own employees.324 Furthermore, the Constitution of ILO325 allows the Governing 
Body to set an ad hoc Commission of Inquiry for complaints of serious non-compliance 
with ratified conventions. So far, there have been only 12 Commissions of Inquiry 
established.  
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Article 22 of the Constitution requires the member states to submit an annual report 
explaining how they are implementing the Conventions they have ratified. In case a state 
fails to fulfil this obligation, other states can make a complaint or a trade union can make a 
representation to that effect. The Governing Body refers complaints to a Commission of 
Inquiry where appropriate according to Arts 26–9 of the ILO Constitution. The 
Commission publishes its report and the Committee of Experts on the Application of 
Conventions and Recommendations follows up on implementation of the Commission’s 
recommendations. The representations are reviewed by the Governing Body, which also 
decides whether to publish the representation along with a possible response received from 
the relevant government or to appoint an ad hoc committee in order to investigate the case 
further.326 
5.4.2 The Right to Strike in the ILO Context 
A single explicit reference to the workers right to strike with regard to the actions of the 
International Labour Conference (ILC), the Governing Body, the Committee on Freedom 
of Association, and the Committee of Experts is hard to find. Nevertheless it should be 
taken as a presumption that the lack of a declarative statement regarding the existence of 
such a right is inconclusive.327 Arguably the textual absence of the right to strike has 
allowed the ILO supervisory bodies to develop the scope and meaning of the right to strike 
over the years.328 
The right to strike is indeed a notion that has developed over time. Its history dates back to 
the earliest days of the ILO. It is therefore extremely important to recognize how 
terminology has been used over time. Terms used in 1919 or 1948 may very well have 
different implications which have changed or evolved during the ILO’s nearly 100 year 
history.329 For instance, for those on the Commission on International Labour Legislation 
who drafted the Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles the “freedom of association” was 
indeed more extensive that merely meaning the joining together of workers in trade unions 
for the purpose of collective bargaining. At the end of the First World War, strikes were 
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taking place everywhere in Europe. The Commission had to understand that engaging in 
collective bargaining also meant supporting the respective demands by threatening to take 
industrial action and occasionally resorting to use of economic pressure in the forms of 
picketing and strikes. In this sense, freedom of association extended to actions taken by 
workers to further their occupational interests.330 
During the discussions in 1947 and 1948 in the Conference committee dealing with the 
Convention No. 87, the Committee on Freedom of Association and Industrial Relations, 
the only serious disagreement was about whether there should be an express mention of a 
right not to join a union. Any limitations to the right to strike as such were never proposed 
or even suggested. And what is very obvious is that the matter did not go unnoticed. The 
Office’s preparatory paper included elements from the original submissions to the 
ECOSOC331 explicitly listing the right to strike as a matter to be considered. Furthermore, 
it would have actually been rather improper to include any sort of a qualifier to the 
formation of associations and the activities they could engage in as in 1948 it was clear that 
some countries had banned certain forms of industrial action which the Convention was 
designed to permit.332 
Even today the CFA cases are decided strictly on the basis of the facts of the case and the 
Committee does not make general statements about freedom of association. The ILO does 
approach the right to strike on a case-by-case basis which is – to some extent – similar to 
the common law practice. And the CFA is the primary instance responsible for the 
development of this case law. If the cases are reviewed, it becomes clear that according to 
CFA there is a right to strike, but it is not an unlimited right.333 For example, the CFA has 
held that the right to strike is not limited to industrial disputes relating to collective 
bargaining, but has excluded political strikes and strikes that are systematically decided 
upon before any negotiations have taken place. This means that, in principle, strikes would 
be allowed as long as social or economic interests of workers are concerned and that 
workers can utilize the right to strike when social and economic policy problems that 
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concern them directly are at stake. Sympathy strikes should be allowed given that the 
initial strike is lawful.334  
Even though strikes are usually exercised by organizations, such as trade unions, the term 
‘workers’ used in both ILO Conventions gives an indication that the right could also be an 
individual right and the CFA has confirmed that it is a right of workers and their 
organizations. However, the ILO has also been willing to accept that the right to take 
collective action may be reserved for trade unions only. Thus, prohibitions by law on wild 
cat strikes (or unofficial industrial actions) have been accepted by the ILO.335 The 
supervisory bodies have considered, for example, obligations to give prior notice, to 
engage in conciliation and voluntary arbitration, to obtain agreement of a given majority 
where it does not make a strike action difficult or even impossible and to hold a secret 
ballot to decide on strike action as legitimate conditions for the exercising of the right to 
strike. Furthermore, the legislative principle that prohibits strikes during the time a legally 
binding collective agreement is in force has been considered acceptable regardless of 
clearly restrictive element it constitutes.336 In addition, ILO Conventions do not assess 
closed shop arrangements, leaving the question to the individual states to address.337 
With reference to the responses of ILO in matters concerning freedom of association, one 
definition can be established: ILO has demonstrated that the jurisprudence of CFA is 
definitively expressed in the language of rights. ILO has also concluded that the freedom 
of association is an integral part of the protected, basic human rights. Trade union rights 
are to be respected regardless the level of development of the country concerned. ILO has 
considered all complaints concerning freedom of association to have an extremely high 
level of importance.338 However, without trying to deny the commitment and achievements 
by ILO, a few issues still remain. Albeit the CFA and Commission of Inquiry are 
potentially powerful tools for workers and their representative organizations, the lack of 
enforcement procedures beyond voluntary compliance arguably means that in cases where 
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the State’s co-operation is the primary issue, achieving real-life effective solutions remains 
uncertain.339 
Conclusively, the freedom of association as it has been addressed in the ILO since 1919 
does include the right of workers to act in defense of their occupational interests and this 
was confirmed in Convention No. 87 in 1948. In the historical sense this right has been 
referred to as the right to strike by the CFA.340 Throughout its existence, the CFA has 
given the right to strike an essence of being an “intrinsic corollary” of the right to organize 
protected by Convention No. 87. Articles 3, 8 and 10 of Convention No 87 are aimed at 
protecting trade unions’ right to organize their administration and activities, to formulate 
their programmes and to further workers’ interests. These are also the articles that have 
been continuously interpreted to implicitly include the right to strike.341 
5.4.3 The ILO and the EU 
The relationship between the EU and ILO has been described by the European 
Commission and Council as one of ‘cooperation’ and constructive dialogue. Novitz has 
suggested that this kind of a conception of this relationship is alert to the creative aspects 
of discourse, and, it also summons up a vision of a deliberative process. This process 
establishes the possibility that those formulating EU social policy can actually benefit from 
information relating to the treatment of international labour standards in other 
organizations while contributing to the formulation of these standards and their 
enforcement internationally.342 
The means by which the EU might recognize core international labour standards set by the 
ILO are by internal regulatory action and via EU external relations. The first, designed to 
govern the conduct of member states, can be achieved in different ways including 
protection of workers’ rights through Treaty articles, EC directives relating to social 
policy, soft law initiatives, and the fundamental rights jurisprudence of the CJEU. In 
external relations, recognition can be made by making trade and aid preferences 
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conditional on compliance with international labour standards. While the relationship of 
the ILO and the EU is further considered in the chapter 5, it should be emphasized here 
that the implementation of ILO norms within the Union was initially minimal and still is 
far from comprehensive. As an international actor the EU has definitely taken more interest 
in the promotion of these standards as a condition for access of third countries to trade and 
aid. In this sense, justification is sought via direct references to ILO Conventions.343 
With respect to EU regulation, particular concerns have been raised in relation to the right 
to strike as recognized by the ILO as a vital aspect of freedom of association. If true 
solidarity between workers across the Union is to be made possible, a European provision 
for the right to strike would be necessary. Fears have been expressed that the free 
movement of goods might prevent workers taking industrial action. To some extent, this 
issue has been addressed by the ‘Monti’ Regulation.344 This regulation identifies the right 
to strike as an exception, but does not provide for an actual European definition of the 
scope of legitimate industrial action. Also, it would seem that the Commission does not 
consider the absence of a treaty base for the protection of freedom of association as a 
problem. In the context of EU’s external relations, the Commission has held the opinion 
that the fundamental principles and rights at work recognized and identified by the ILO 
apply in their entirety to the countries of EU. This statement does not, however, clarify the 
fact that this is done by virtue of the independent commitments of EU member states as 
member of the ILO and not by EU regulation. The Commission’s intervention has been 
seemingly limited to merely recommending ratification of certain ILO Conventions. 
Apparently the Commission assumes that the member states are complying with their 
international obligations to respect freedom of association. Unfortunately this is not always 
the case in EU member states, as demonstrated by a few CEACR Individual Observations 
concerning Convention No. 87 of 2003 (namely the ones concerning Austria, Belgium, 
Denmark and Germany).345 
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Those core international labour standards that do not, or cannot receive protection by the 
virtue of adopted directives, can still achieve recognition through CJEU fundamental rights 
jurisprudence. If the Court adopts such rights as “general principles”, these can also be 
applied to limit the scope of EC (EU) law or activities of EU institutions and even restrict 
the actions of the member states. The Court has a history of appreciating that international 
labour standards can actually constitute fundamental rights. For instance, with respect to 
the prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sex the Court has made a direct 
reference to respective rights set out in the ILO Convention No. 111. Already in the 
Bosman346 case, the Court stated that the principle of freedom of association is ‘one of the 
fundamental rights which, as the Court has consistently held . . . are protected under the 
Community legal order’.347 
 
5.5 Evolving Views? The Negative and Positive Rights Revisited 
According to Fernando Valdes Dal-Re, in the reality of the legal framework and practice of 
the European systems of labour relations, the term collective rights of workers and 
employers constitutes a synthesis concept which encompasses a complex combination of 
legal faculties of a very diverse content. It is possible to classify collective rights in this 
sense by ‘major differentiation criterion’ into rights of organization and rights of 
activity.348 
The rights of organization can be further divided into two groups of rights: individual and 
collective proprietorship. The individual proprietorship includes both ‘positive rights’, as 
in the right of all workers to form and to join an organization, and a ‘negative right’ 
respectively, which is the right to refrain from joining an organization. Collective 
proprietorship rights are extended to the representative organizations’ rights. These rights 
include, for instance, the right to draw up administrative regulations and to form or join 
organizations of second or higher rank. Activity rights are understood as the rights that 
enable the exercising of industrial actions. Activity rights exist for workers and employers 
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as individuals and to their respective organizations for the protection of their economic and 
social interests. Accordingly, the concept of industrial action includes measures such as 
collective bargaining, trade union actions in a company or the right to strike.349 
When considered the actual reality of what workers’ usually seek within the sphere of 
rights, a relation to civil and political, or ’negative’ rights is quite often discovered. The 
primary claims that workers make as individuals, or the ones that trade unions (or other 
representatives) make on behalf of them, are usually within the context of the freedom of 
association, such as to act in association engaging in collective bargaining. In this context, 
the question is especially about the exercising of their rights without the interference of the 
relevant state. Therefore, a submitted claim is usually a request for freedom of action such 
as immunity from civil or criminal liability for organizing or participating in an industrial 
action.350 
Today, the traditional dichotomy between the positive and negative rights can be, and has 
been, questioned. These considerations are actively gaining ground among (labour law) 
scholars, and it would seem that these opinions are influencing the international human 
rights discourse as well. As Sarah Joseph puts it, “the strict division of civil and political 
rights on the one hand, and economic social and cultural rights on the other into 
categories of ‘negative’ and ‘positive’, is misleading. All rights have positive and negative 
aspects.” She further argues that, for instance, it is impossible for a state to guarantee the 
freedom from torture by simply agreeing to refrain from it. Measures always need to be 
taken, such as training programs for relevant personnel and legislative actions to ensure 
procedural aspects. Opportunities for torture must be prevented and, when such threats 
arise, they must also be detected and intercepted.351 Regarding the EU context, Weiss has 
argued that one, and probably the most important, reason for the introduction of 
fundamental social rights to the founding Treaties was exactly the fact that it would help to 
overcome the false dichotomy between traditional fundamental rights and social or 
economic rights.352 
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The perceivable fact is that some provisions which are traditionally considered as civil and 
political rights seem to have a lot of positive characteristics and, vice versa, some rights 
provided by ICESCR seem largely negative by nature. For example, the right to fair trial in 
article 14 of ICCPR sets legislative requirements for such things as trained judges and 
occasionally legal aid. Even though this is stated in the ICCPR, which should be implying 
negative rights, the undertone is clearly positive. A similar observation can be made with 
respect to article 8 of the ICESCR, which contains an obviously negative aspect to it as the 
states are required to refrain from interfering with proper functioning of trade unions.353 To 
take an even more basic example, one could consider freedom and equality. These two 
rights are very much in danger to remain merely formal if the social capacity to enjoy them 
is not taken care of. Civic rights need a firm social basis to actually be relevant. The 
interrelation of traditional fundamental rights and fundamental social rights is more than 
merely of one being basic for every (enlightened) society and the other just an instrument 
of a welfare state – these rights are two sides of the same coin.354 
Arguably, all human rights predicate similar obligations with each other. Typically, these 
call for respecting, protecting and fulfilling the enjoyment of relevant rights. Each and 
every obligation can be categorized in a similar manner that has been used to categorize 
human rights in positive and negative rights. And there are no obvious reasons why every 
obligation could not be categorized as either negative or positive. For instance, the 
obligation to respect a right entails negative obligations and the obligations to protect and 
fulfil rights and duties are positive by nature. The active protection of human rights in 
which the states must enact on, should include enforcement of legislation and controlling 
the actions of non-state actors to a reasonable but sufficient degree. This is especially 
emphasized in the area of labour rights when considered how much the private sector has 
control over the availability of work. The fulfilment obligations should safeguard adequate 
resource allocation especially for those in a position unable to provide for themselves.355 
Thus, one could come to conclusion, that the question is more about the perspective and 
opinion rather than whether or not the right is actually negative or positive by nature. 
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This kind of rationalization has also been practiced by the Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural rights. Accordingly, it has emphasized that the states actively have the 
obligation to ‘respect, protect and fulfil’ the rights set in place by the ICESCR. Obligation 
to respect, for instance, requires the states not to take action that would lead in denying 
individuals access to the Covenant rights. Furthermore, the obligation to protect requires 
measures that actively ensure that neither enterprises nor private individuals can prevent 
individuals from exercising their rights. Finally, in order to fulfil the obligations the states 
must actively take positive actions intended to facilitate people’s access to and utilization 
of resources and the means to enjoy the respective rights. The obligation is especially 
important with respect to the segment of people who are unable to exercise or access their 
rights beyond their control, states must positively enact and ‘step in’ to provide such rights 
directly.356 
A debate over the positive and negative aspects of rights was under consideration in the 
negotiations of the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. The concern was whether the 
social and economic rights, in contrast to civil and political rights, should be included in 
the EU Charter at all. The question was — once again — about the justiciability of 
economic and social rights. Opinions to this were divided between those who favoured 
including the social and economic rights in the Charter and those who wished to exclude 
them. The primary arguments for exclusion were founded on the grounds that social and 
economic rights were not part of the existing acquis communautaire, or that they fell 
outside the competences of the EU. Thus, it was considered that it should also be ensured 
that the EU Charter would not become an instrument for any future expansions of EU 
competences in the social sphere of rights.357 
The parties that would have included the social and economic rights in the Charter were 
even further divided. First, there were those who wished to separate some economic and 
social rights as being justiciable and subjective from the rights that are programmatic. The 
justiciable rights would be included in the first section of the Charter with civil and 
political rights and the programmatic rights would have a separate chapter. Secondly, there 
were suggestions of adopting an inclusion of a specific horizontal clause which would 
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prevent any extensions of EU competences through the Charter provisions. This clause 
would have been applicable to the Charter in general, but specifically aimed towards the 
social and economic rights. Finally, there were also few who would have included social 
and economic rights alongside the civil and political rights altogether.358 The outcome was 
something in between. The Charter included a single list of fundamental rights which were 
both civil and political as they were social and economic alike. The EU Charter was 
approved by the European Council but it was limited to a political declaration and thus had 
no formal legal status.359 That is, until the establishment of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. 
 
 
                                                 
358 Bercusson 2006, pp. 37–38. 
359 Bercusson 2006, pp. 38–39. 
101 
 
6 Conclusions 
There are definitively significant differences on how the Member States traditionally 
approach freedom of association and what do they consider as legitimate means of 
collective action. The diversity exists all the way up to the constitutional levels. These 
differences are emphasized and underlined when the historical context of the national 
industrial relations systems is examined. Thus it is difficult to establish a certain single 
meaning of the right to strike in Member States’ national legislations. If some definition 
for the essence of the right to strike should be established, the determination could be 
better sought trough international treaties. In this sense, the idea of workers’ rights predates 
pretty much every other international human rights instrument. Both the UN Covenants 
and the Conventions adopted by the ILO do recognize the right to strike and provide 
content for the concept. Even though these instruments are traditionally considered to 
provide for internationally recognized minimum standards, it can also be established that 
the international obligations are nonetheless de facto obligations with meaningful content. 
As such, it is also possible to regard the freedom of association and the relevant rights 
rising therefrom as the very defining elements of the European social model. In a complex 
system of the EU diversity has always existed which has necessitated development of 
elements like the social dialogue. Even though the freedom of association and the right to 
strike have been recognized as fundamental rights of the Community, the lack of 
legislative competences at the EU level effectively hands the determination of these 
concepts exclusively to the Member States. In principle it could be possible, but also 
remains unseen for the time being, whether the soft law approaches like the OMC are 
accepted as a true alternative to address issues such as collective actions at the EU level. 
Ever since the DFDS Torline, it has been clear that the rules of applicable law can have an 
effect to the effective exercising of the right to take collective action. It is also evident that 
the case directly prompted the introduction of a special provision on industrial action in 
Rome II. One of the defining elements throughout the whole preparatory phase of Article 9 
was that it was intended for and associated with the protection of the rights of workers. It 
was also suggested by the Swedish delegation that the diversity of different industrial 
relations systems in Europe needed safeguarding against the potential implications by the 
DFDS Torline case. The underlying idea was that if the matter was not addressed the 
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delicate balance of the national labour markets would be seriously disturbed. Overall, it is 
possible to consider that the inclusion of Article 9 does in fact demonstrate at least some 
level of intent to respect the right to strike on behalf of the EU legislator. However, the 
actual solution does not necessarily provide for the intended level of protection. 
In other words, there exists a legitimate doubt that Art 9 of Rome II is not up to the task it 
was originally called to address. The pressing need was the uncertainty arising out of the 
doubt that applying the lex loci damni as a connecting factor to industrial disputes would 
lead to undesired results. It is likely that under similar circumstances to the DFDS Torline 
these uncertainties might be avoided in future. However, the question of whether the locus 
actus as a connecting factor is sufficient to protect the fundamental rights of workers i.e. 
the right to strike seems rather confusing and definitively inconclusive. Article 9 is 
applicable only to the non-contractual obligations rising out of industrial actions. First of 
all, it is questionable whether the issue of characterization regarding the concepts utilized 
in Art 9 can be conclusively determined. To be added, the provision does have the 
potential to subject parties of a single industrial dispute in cross-border cases to different 
legal regimes if the law applicable to a tort rising out an industrial action and the law 
applicable to the action itself are different. This has been suggested by, for instance, 
Dorssemont and Van Hoek360. Such effects seem hardly adequate if the protection of the 
right to strike is concerned. 
The Laval quartet has even further emphasized the fact that the regulation on jurisdiction 
can have potentially tremendous consequences to the outcomes of litigations in industrial 
disputes. And these litigations can affect the national legislations of the Member States 
rather directly.  The CJEU has itself considered the right to strike as a fundamental right of 
the Community but it is highly questionable whether the decisions of the Court actually 
take the diversity of the European industrial relations systems properly into account. The 
decisions have introduced rather dramatic changes in legislation in some Member States 
such as Sweden and Germany. As previously mentioned, what is basically demanded from 
Sweden means more or less of a total reformulation of the Swedish law. In contrast to this, 
on the other hand, comparative studies have shown that in some Member States the effects 
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have been next to none361. Nevertheless, if it is taken into account that the EU relies 
heavily on the Member States’ to actively protect the fundamental rights, the judgments 
seem inconsistent at the very least. The Court seems willing to almost bypass constitutional 
considerations if the market freedoms are threatened. As long as the Member States have 
jurisdiction over industrial relations, it is questionable whether the CJEU can claim 
primacy in this sense. 
The approach of solving aforementioned conflicts issues with a rule of supremacy seems 
unsatisfactory. It is suggestible that when constitutional dimensions are under 
consideration rules for vertical conflicts do not provide desirable results.  The 
circumstances would call for mediation. According to Joerges, the CJEU has a specific 
task to fulfil in this sense. It must evolve supranational law which mediates between 
different European traditions and interests and which resolves conflicts of interests 
appropriately. The fact that Member States are not properly equipped for the task does not 
suddenly turn the Court into a “super-constitutional-court equipped with the powers to 
reformulate constitutional orders of the Member States”, even though the competences 
may sometimes overlap in the sense of a diagonal conflict.362 
With respect to the definition of the freedom of association in the international context 
there are concerns that, in the light of the Laval quartet, EU law could be contradicting the 
international obligations of the Member States. For instance, the ILO has raised serious 
concerns over the position of the right to strike within the EU area. It is seems possible that 
the effects of these cases may induce breaches by ILO membership countries regarding the 
ILO Conventions 87 and 98. The ILO Committee of Experts has expressed such a view in 
its 2013 General Report on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations. 
According to Bruun et al., even if these considerations would not be regarded as legal 
questions in a strict sense, they do give rise to complex political questions. In Sweden the 
two confederations of employees have jointly submitted a special comment to the CEACR 
on Sweden’s application of the relevant ILO Conventions arguing that the Swedish Laval 
legislation violates the international obligations of the country. These arguments include, 
for example, the fact that facilitating a company’s entry into a market is not a reason 
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accepted by the ILO for restricting the right to take industrial action. The situation calls for 
political initiative. Member States cannot accept that EU would force them to actively 
violate their international commitments.363  
If some further considerations regarding such initiatives would be considered there are few 
developments that should be shortly mentioned. First, it is possible that the most adverse 
restrictive effects of the Laval quartet might actually be mitigated by the entering into force 
of the Lisbon Treaty and thus the transposition of the EU Charter into primary law. The 
question remains, however, open for the time being. From the perspective of the 
fundamental social rights, and the right to strike in particular, the development seems 
nevertheless largely positive. Second, another solution to the issue might be provided by 
the EU’s future accession to the ECHR. Without going into further detail on the possible 
division of competences between the two relevant Courts it is suggestible that, at the very 
least, the accession could have a positive influence to the CJEU’s acceptance of 
fundamental social rights. Traditionally speaking, the ECtHR has been modestly reluctant 
to regard the collective bargaining or the right to strike as vital aspects of the freedom of 
association, which has also influenced the CJEU to some extent in the past. The approach 
of the ECtHR has, however, changed following the Grand Chamber’s judgement in Demir 
and Baykara v Turkey364. In this case, the ECtHR held that the right to bargain collectively 
with the employer has, in principle, become one of the essential elements of the ‘right to 
form and to join trade unions for the protection of interests’ set forth in Article 11 of the 
Convention.365 The ECtHR’s later jurisprudence has also shown similar developments. As 
indicated by the Grand Chamber, any interference with the right to strike must be justified 
with reference to Article 11(2) ECHR. While the ECtHR has evolved its view on the right 
to strike, it is rather hypothetical to assess whether the CJEU will accept this interpretation 
in the future.366 It remains to be seen how the CJEU takes these developments into 
consideration. 
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